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EU Trade Policy  
Reform
Levelling the Playing Field in a 
New Geo-Economic Environment
Today, trade policy is used more and more often to achieve geopo-
litical goals. To defend European interests in this new geo-economic 
environment, the EU must recalibrate its unilateral, bilateral, and 
multilateral trade toolbox. While the EU needs to counter the increas-
ingly unlevel international playing field, self-sufficiency is not a viable 
option. The strength of the EU depends on its openness and integra-
tion in world markets. 
 – The Unilateral (EU) Dimension: The EU needs to be assertive in the 
application of its trade defense instruments. While the 2018 reform 
of antidumping measures was a good start, the EU also needs to 
strengthen and supplement other instruments – particularly coun-
tervailing measures to address foreign subsidies as well as the EU’s 
Enforcement Regulation.
 – The Bilateral Dimension: It would be wrong to only focus on the 
unilateral and defensive side of trade policy. The EU also needs to 
push ahead with bilateral free trade agreements to open foreign 
markets and to help shape globalization and rules-based trade. The 
ratification and utilization of such FTAs need to be improved.
 – The Multilateral Dimension: Predictable and transparent rules 
and their enforcement are indispensable for the EU. Thus, the EU 
should intensify its efforts – together with like-minded countries 
– to modernize the rule book of the WTO. It should pursue plurilat-
eral agreements on e-commerce and possibly industrial subsidies, 
improve the WTO notification requirements through counter- 
notifications, and reform its dispute settlement mechanism.
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Open Strategic Autonomy is the EU’s new trade par-
adigm. European Commission President Ursula von 
der Leyen wants to reposition the EU in a changed 
geo-economic environment. Protectionism, state in-
terventionism, and national go-it-alone strategies 
are en vogue. In addition, trade policy is increasing-
ly used to achieve geopolitical objectives. The Euro-
pean Union can no longer rely on traditional partners 
such as the United States; China has become a sys-
temic competitor. Meanwhile, the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) is in deep crisis.
Given the changing nature of the trade policy envi-
ronment worldwide, the European Commission rightly 
initiated a review of the EU’s trade policy instruments. 
The EU needs to be sufficiently equipped to counter 
unfair trade practices that harm EU producers at home 
and abroad. Without doubt, some of the existing 
instruments require sharpening and new instruments 
have to be created. At the same time, self-sufficiency 
is not a viable option. Protectionism would cost jobs, 
income, and wealth and lead to greater income in-
equality. The EU should pursue an active, liberal trade 
policy that clearly aligns trade defense measures with 
Union interests. Trade policy should not primarily be 
used as a lever for other policy objectives. In addition, 
the European Union needs to be careful not to further 
undermine the multilateral trading system by estab-
lishing unilateral instruments that are not compati-
ble with WTO rules.
Thus, while the wider public focuses primarily on the 
defensive side of trade policy – the unilateral dimen-
sion at the EU level – it would be shortsighted to ne-
glect the bilateral and multilateral dimension. All 
three dimensions work hand in hand and cannot be 
separated when discussing possible changes to EU 
trade policy. In our analysis, we recommend the fol-
lowing reforms to these three dimensions:
THE UNILATERAL (EU) DIMENSION
1. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES (AD): EU antidumping 
measures are an important tool to protect European 
producers from unfair competition from abroad. The 
2018 reform of the AD Regulation was of great im-
portance. Therefore, before reforming the AD toolkit 
again, a detailed analysis of its effectiveness should 
be carried out first – including consultations with all 
relevant stakeholders. Possible reform measures in-
clude the following: The Commission should assist 
companies in establishing the necessary evidence for 
dumping by publishing further reports about price 
distortions in third countries. Procedures should be 
further streamlined to lower administrative costs to 
help small companies. Furthermore, the Commission 
should more often pursue antidumping and anti-sub-
sidy investigations in parallel. Lastly, an extension 
of the antidumping instruments to trade in services 
should be examined.
2. COUNTERVAILING (ANTI-SUBSIDY) DUTIES: 
The WTO rules on subsidies, embedded in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures (SCM Agreement), are weak. The EU should pur-
sue multilateral, plurilateral (in the best case, under 
the WTO), and bilateral efforts (such as in free trade 
agreements) to develop better disciplines on indus-
trial subsidies and state-owned enterprises, and to 
strengthen notification disciplines. The proposals of 
the Trilateral Initiative (the EU, Japan, and the Unit-
ed States) on appropriate rules is a step in the right 
direction. The EU should also reform its countervail-
ing measures (CVM). The framework for CVMs should 
be strengthened and its application should be facil-
itated. In the future, CVMs should be designed in a 
way that allows them to more fully address the mar-
ket-distortive effects of foreign state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs).
3. ENFORCEMENT REGULATION AND CHIEF TRADE 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: The amendment to the 
EU’s Enforcement Regulation is indispensable to en-
sure that the EU can deal effectively with trade con-
flicts. If a country is not willing to engage in media-
tion after a WTO panel report, the EU needs to be able 
to retaliate in order to ensure a level playing field and 
fair competition. Still, the first priority must always 
be the reform of the multilateral dispute settlement 
system. The newly established Chief Trade Enforce-
ment Officer (CTEO) can also help strengthen the po-
sition of the European Union by, for example, mon-
itoring trade agreements by partner countries. The 
CTEO should be given a clear and transparent man-
date and sufficient resources.
4. EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CRITICAL PRODUCTS 
DURING CRISES: Export controls – even if they are 
compatible with WTO rules – are not the right way 
to address alleged shortages in critical products with 
complex value chains. Instead, a policy is needed that 
secures and strengthens global supply chains for pro-
tective gear and medical goods. To increase resilience, 
the EU should thoroughly analyze vulnerabilities in 
critical supply chains. Further measures include diver-
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as well as strategic reserves and stockpiling. In addi-
tion, the EU should push the G20 countries to elimi-
nate customs duties on pharmaceutical products and 
intermediate products as well as medical products in 
an unbureaucratic, comprehensive, and lasting manner.
5. INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT 
(IPI): The IPI is a useful tool to give the EU more lever-
age to achieve more reciprocity in government pro-
curement. The Commission’s current IPI proposal 
needs to be further revised, however, to avoid nega-
tive implications for the procurement process. Thus, 
the leverage effect vis-à-vis third countries should 
be strengthened, for example by more effective price 
penalties. At the same time, excessive bureaucratic 
costs and legal uncertainty for EU companies and 
contracting authorities, as well as legal uncertain-
ties and risks regarding penalties, must be avoided. 
The EU also needs to ensure that the IPI does not re-
sult in a worsening of relations with partner countries. 
Overall, the IPI needs to be balanced, non-protec-
tionist, and compatible with the rules and principles 
enshrined in the WTO’s Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA).
6. COUNTERING EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF SANC-
TIONS: For years, the EU has struggled with the extra-
territorial reach of sanctions and export controls of the 
United States. Extraterritorial sanctions harm the eco-
nomic and foreign policy sovereignty of the EU and im-
pair the global competitiveness of the European econ-
omy. The EU therefore needs to sharpen its tools to 
counter extraterritorial sanctions. The use of the EU’s 
blocking statute is an important political signal. The EU 
should, however, examine the effects in greater detail 
in order not to harm European companies in the end. 
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Y The EU should also create an instrument that ensures 
access to essential export-related services, in partic-
ular for the processing of payments. To ensure the ef-
fectiveness of such a payment mechanism, a critical 
mass of EU member states should join. At the cen-
ter of the EU’s ability to counter extraterritorial sanc-
tions stands the role of the euro in the international 
payment system. To strengthen its use and make the 
European Union less dependent on the US dollar, the 
EU needs to advance its financial sector reforms, push 
forward further economic integration, and strengthen 
its attractiveness by investing more in the competi-
tiveness of its economy.
7. INVESTMENT SCREENING: The European Union 
greatly benefits from foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Government interventions are justified to protect 
national security and public order. But investment 
screening needs to be proportionate and not create 
uncertainties and unjustified infringements in private 
property. Situations in which the state can and should 
intervene need to be clearly defined. Political measures 
should by no means encourage the international trend 
toward investment protectionism. EU member states 
should inform each other about investment restric-
tions and more thoroughly coordinate their efforts.
8. BORDER ADJUSTMENT MEASURES (BAM): In ear-
ly March 2020, the Commission proposed a European 
Climate Law as part of the so-called EU Green Deal. 
That law proposes a legally binding target of net zero 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. This goal also 
has a trade dimension. To ensure that EU industry is 
not put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign produc-
ers, the Commission proposes to implement BAMs for 
greenhouse gas-intensive goods from countries that 
have implemented no or insufficient climate protection 
measures. Carbon Border Adjustments should only be 
implemented under the strict proviso that WTO com-
patibility and practicability are guaranteed. A careful 
and comprehensive impact assessment is indispens-
able. The Commission should also evaluate alterna-
tive instruments against carbon leakage. Furthermore, 
support for the transformation of industry is key.
THE BILATERAL DIMENSION
9. CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS (FTAS): The EU’s comprehen-
sive FTAs with strategic partners have both positive 
economic and geostrategic effects. They also help to 
shape globalization by establishing modern trade 
rules in the absence of multilateral rules. In order 
to preserve the EU’s leverage, however, the cohesion 
of its trade policy is crucial. It is also important that 
concluded FTAs are ratified and implemented in a 
more timely manner. In order to facilitate ratification, 
EU-only trade agreements (i.e. FTAs that fall into the 
exclusive competence of the EU level) are the right 
way forward. In order to improve the utilization rate of 
FTAs, the EU should negotiate simple and standard-
ized rules of origin. In addition, the European Com-
mission must make sure that no sensitive data must 
be revealed to foreign entities to verify that a product 
falls under the agreement. The EU should also deepen 
some of the existing chapters of its FTAs – first and 
foremost those on digital trade.
THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSION
10. THE MULTILATERAL AGENDA – REFORMING THE 
WTO: Reforming the WTO must remain a top priority 
for the European Union. The most pressing issue 
is reestablishing a functioning dispute settlement 
system. The multi-party interim appeal arbitration 
arrangement (MPIA) is an important step in uphold-
ing the rules-based trading system – but it is only a 
temporary solution. In addition, WTO rules need to be 
strengthened, in particular on subsidies. Market dis-
tortion and overcapacity through government sub-
sidization should be avoided in all cases. Plurilateral 
agreements within and outside of the WTO – such as 
those currently negotiated on digital trade; services; 
investment; and micro, small, and medium-sized en-
terprises (MSMEs) – are a viable option to advance 
the global trade rule book. Last but not least, the EU 
needs to double its efforts to encourage emerging 
market economies such as China to “graduate” and 
opt-out of the special and differential treatment.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2020, the European Commission launched a 
review of its trade policy as announced in the pro-
posal for a major recovery plan “Europe’s Moment: 
Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation.”1 In a 
public consultation, the Commission is asking the 
European Parliament (EP), EU member states, and 
all other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society 
and businesses, to provide input for the reform pro-
cess. The aim is to strengthen EU trade and invest-
ment policy in order to help economic recovery after 
the coronavirus pandemic and to better protect Eu-
ropean companies from unfair trading practices from 
major trading partners.2
The reason for the trade policy review lies in the 
changing geo-economic and geopolitical environ-
ment as well as the coronavirus pandemic. Compe-
tition on international markets is becoming fiercer. 
Economic nationalism, protectionism, and unilater-
alism are on the rise. New tariffs, regulatory barri-
ers, state subsidies, forced technology transfer, and 
investment restrictions are increasingly putting fair 
competition to the test.3 While trade growth rates 
were already low before the pandemic, trade num-
bers have plunged since its outbreak. Several coun-
tries have implemented new export controls. In 
addition, global value chains are changing; the trend 
toward the re-regionalization and re-nationalization 
of value chains has accelerated. There is a stronger 
involvement of the state in the economy, and trade 
policy is increasingly used to achieve geopolitical 
objectives.
In the United States, President Donald Trump put 
an end to decades of liberal trade policy, pursuing a 
protectionist “America First” approach. Washington 
is increasingly willing to use its economic weight as 
leverage to pursue American interests. Its weapons 
of choice are tariffs, new export controls, Buy Amer-
ican rules, investment screening, and sanctions with 
extraterritorial character. These instruments are not 
only directed at economic rivals such as China but 
also at long-standing allies such as Canada and the 
1 European Commission, EU Long-term Budget 2021–2027: *Commission Proposal May 2020, May 28, 2020:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/eu-long-term-budget/2021-2027_en#documents> (accessed August 17, 2020).
2 European Commission, “European Commission Kicks Off Major EU Trade Policy Review,” Press Release, June 16, 2020:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1058> (accessed September 27, 2020).
3 WTO, “Trade-restrictive Measures Continue at Historically High Level,” July 22, 2019:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/trade_monitoring_e.htm> (accessed August 17, 2020).
4 European Commission, “EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, European Commission Contribution to the European Council,” March 12, 2019, p. 4:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf> (accessed March 31, 2020).
5 WTO, “Trade Falls Steeply in First Half of 2020,” June 22, 2020: <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr862_e.htm> (accessed July 14, 2020).
6 WTO Data: <https://data.wto.org/> (accessed October 26, 2020)
EU. Consequently, the EU can no longer rely on its 
role as a traditional partner of the United States.
China, with its planned economy, restricted mar-
ket access, and difficult investment environment, 
has been a political and economic challenge for the 
EU for years, but competition is getting even fiercer. 
With its Made in China 2025 Strategy, Beijing is ac-
tively promoting key business sectors to become a 
technological superpower – at the expense of others. 
China is also willing to use its economic leverage to 
pursue its geopolitical interests. In March 2019, the 
EU issued a communication vis-à-vis Beijing, calling 
the country “an economic competitor in the pursuit 
of technological leadership and a systemic rival.”4
At the same time, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is in deep crisis. Over decades, the WTO, to-
gether with its predecessor the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was the guardian of an 
open, rules-based trading system. The rules of the 
multilateral organization, however, no longer re-
flect the realities of 21st-century trade. The WTO 
offers little regarding investment, competition, and 
digital trade. Its rules are weak on subsidies, forced 
technology transfer, and export controls. In Decem-
ber 2019, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism 
ceased to function due to the refusal of the United 
States to allow the appointment of new members to 
the Appellate Body (AB).
The coronavirus crisis poses another severe chal-
lenge for the EU. Due to the asymmetrical course of 
the crisis and recoveries, global trade and global in-
vestment flows are likely to recuperate only slowly. 
According to the WTO, the volume of world mer-
chandise trade  is forecasted to drop by 9.2 percent 
in 2020, followed by a slow recovery of +7.2 percent 
in 2021.5
This has a massive impact on the European Union, 
which is deeply integrated in the world economy. 
Total goods exports of the EU-28 accounted for 30.7 
percent of world exports (including intra-EU trade) 
in 2019. Total EU-28 goods imports made up 28.7 
percent of world imports (including intra-EU trade).6 
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Trade as a percentage of GDP stood at 91 percent in 
2019;7 EU exports secure 36 million jobs in Europe.8
Reacting to this changed trade policy environment, 
the new President of the European Commission, 
Ursula von der Leyen, has proposed a new paradigm 
for the EU.9 The new policy approach is to reap the 
benefits of openness for European businesses, work-
ers, and consumers while protecting them from un-
fair practices and building resilience to better equip 
them for future challenges.10 In addition, trade is to 
make a greater contribution to climate protection 
and sustainability.
How can the EU position itself more strategical-
ly? Which strategic instruments should the EU have 
and/or which instruments should be expanded? In 
the following we will review the core trade policy in-
struments of the EU in order to make a contribution 
to the debate on the reform of EU trade and invest-
ment policy. While trade and competition policy are 
closely related, the reform of competition law will be 
subject to future analysis.
Our analysis focuses on the three – and insepara-
ble – dimensions of EU trade and investment policy: 
the unilateral (EU), the bilateral, and the multilateral 
(WTO). We will start with an analysis of the EU’s ex-
isting and proposed (unilateral) trade defense instru-
ments: antidumping and anti-subsidy measures, as 
well as the tabled amendments to the Enforcement 
Regulation and the Chief Trade Enforcement Offi-
cer. We will then take a closer look at export controls 
for medical products before evaluating the proposed 
International Procurement Instrument and EU rules 
for investment screening. The second part of the pa-
per is devoted to an analysis of the EU’s bilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs). We close with an analysis 
of the multilateral agenda of the EU. In order to level 
the playing field while simultaneously reforming the 
rules-based global trading architecture, the recom-
mendations that we propose for each dimension al-
so need to be seen in the context of the other two.
7 World Bank, “Trade as Percentage of GDP”: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS> (accessed July 14, 2020).
8 European Commission, Studie: Internationaler Handel Sichert über 36 Millionen Arbeitsplätze in der EU [Study: International Trade Secures over 36 million 
Jobs in the EU], November 27, 2018: <https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/20181127-handel-36-millionen-jobs-der-eu_de> (accessed July 14, 2020).
9 Ursula von der Leyen, Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the Occasion of the Presentation of her College of 
Commissioners and their Programme, November 27, 2019:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_6408> (accessed August 17, 2020).
10 European Commission, “A Renewed Trade Policy for a Stronger Europe,” Consultation Note, June 16, 2020:  
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/june/tradoc_158779.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2020).
11 European Commission, Trade for All, Towards More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (2015):  
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2020).
12 European Commission, “A Renewed Trade Policy” (see note 9).
13 Ursula von der Leyen, Mission Letter Phil Hogan, Commissioner-designate for Trade, September 10, 2019, pp. 2–6:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-phil-hogan-2019_en.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2020).
2. OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: 
THE EU’S NEW TRADE POLICY
The European Commission is working on a new trade 
strategy. Its most recent one, “Trade for All. Towards 
a More Responsible Trade and Investment Poli-
cy,” dates from 2015.11 While the public consultation 
has just been extended until mid-November 2020,12 
some priorities can already be derived from von der 
Leyen’s work program, which she presented in a 
public letter on September 10, 2019, to then Trade 
Commissioner Phil Hogan. While she emphasized the 
importance of the WTO, Europe is to retaliate more 
quickly if others take illegal actions against the Eu-
ropean Union and prevent the WTO from settling 
disputes. In order to achieve this, a Chief Trade En-
forcement Officer is to be appointed, whose main 
task will be to monitor and enforce the implementa-
tion of trade agreements.
Furthermore, von der Leyen wants to strengthen 
Europe’s leadership role by renewing the partner-
ship with the United States, signing a comprehen-
sive investment agreement with China, enhancing 
the economic partnership with Africa, and conclud-
ing new ambitious free trade agreements, for ex-
ample with Australia and New Zealand. Thirdly, the 
EU’s trade policy is to make an active contribution 
to sustainable development and climate protection. 
This is not just a matter of the sustainability chap-
ters in FTAs and helping to ensure that the United 
Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are 
achieved. Von der Leyen also envisions the introduc-
tion of Carbon Border Adjustments to protect do-
mestic producers from unfair competition posed by 
imports that have a higher carbon footprint.13
According to the Commission, the aforementioned 
trade policy review therefore has two goals. “First, to 
assess how trade policy can contribute to a swift and 
sustainable socio-economic recovery, reinforcing 
competitiveness […].”  Second, the review is to ana-
lyze how trade policy can advance a model of Open 
Strategic Autonomy. The concept note defines Open 
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Strategic Autonomy as follows: “This simply means 
strengthening the EU’s capacity to pursue its own 
interests independently and assertively, while con-
tinuing to work with partners around the world to 
deliver global solutions to global challenges.” It does 
not mean that the EU strives for self-sufficiency ac-
cording to this paper. But it does mean that “trade 
policy should aim to stabilize our strategic engage-
ment with key trading partners in accordance with 
our values, interests, and objectives, while helping to 
diversify our relationships and create alliances with 
like-minded countries.”14 While the transatlantic re-
lationship is identified as of great importance, the 
Commission cautions that close attention has to be 
paid to developing partnerships with other key trad-
ing countries, singling out China as a partner but al-
so a systemic rival.
As a result of the coronavirus crisis, the Commission 
places particular emphasis on supply chain resil-
ience. While acknowledging that the EU cannot be-
come self-sufficient in critical health products, the 
Commission wants to improve resilience by propos-
ing a combination of measures. It also implemented 
highly controversial export controls for protective 
equipment in the early stages of the crisis.
In mid-June 2020, the Commission also presented a 
White Paper called “Levelling the Playing Field as Re-
gards Foreign Subsidies” and launched a public con-
sultation on this proposal. This paper focuses mostly 
on distortions in the EU’s internal market caused by 
foreign subsidies. While the single market and its 
rule book ensure a level playing field for all member 
states, EU rules are rather weak regarding subsidies 
of foreign economic operators in the EU. The White 
Paper therefore contains proposals for the strength-
ening of existing instruments as well as regulato-
ry requirements for the EU Financial Regulation and 
EU international treaties that aim to prevent direct 
or indirect distortions of competition in the internal 
market caused by direct or indirect subsidies from 
third countries. The instruments affect a wide range 
of legal areas, including antitrust law, merger con-
trol, state aid law, public procurement rules, and in-
vestment screening. The White Paper also relates to 
trade policy aspects in WTO agreements. Trade pol-
icy regulations in bilateral agreements concerning 
the prohibition of subsidies or regulations compara-
ble to EU subsidy law are also affected.15
14 Ursula von der Leyen, Mission Letter Phil Hogan (see note 12).
15 European Commission, White Paper on Levelling the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final, June 17, 2020:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/overview/foreign_subsidies_white_paper.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2020).
The various concept papers, White Papers, and con-
sultations signal a change in EU trade policy. Von 
der Leyen and her new Trade Commissioner Valdis 
Dombrovskis seem to be much more willing to use 
the economic power of the common market as lever-
age. Given the changing nature of the trade policy 
environment worldwide, the European Commission 
rightly initiated a review of the EU’s trade policy in-
struments. The EU needs to be better equipped to 
counter unfair trade practices that harm EU produc-
ers at home and abroad. Without doubt, some of the 
existing instruments require sharpening and new in-
struments have to be created. While the Commission 
does not tire of emphasizing the “open” in its new 
trade policy paradigm – placing much stake in the 
WTO – the concept of Open Strategic Autonomy al-
so poses some danger. Protectionist sentiments have 
been on the rise in the European Union for years. 
They are further buoyed by the coronavirus crisis. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that most of the de-
bates around Open Strategic Autonomy focus on the 
defensive side of trade policy. The review could thus 
tilt trade policy in the wrong direction. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The European Union has greatly benefitted from 
globalization and open markets for both trade and 
investment. Self-sufficiency is therefore not a viable 
option for the European Union and its member states. 
Protectionism would cost jobs, income, and wealth, 
and lead to greater income inequality. A concept such 
as full reciprocity as applied by the Trump adminis-
tration – in which openness is compared country by 
country, sector by sector, and product by product – is 
not advisable. As history shows, unilateralism, threats 
of protectionism, and dealmaking have seldomly led 
to more market access abroad.
Given that a large part of global economic growth 
will take place outside of Europe in the future, the 
EU needs to remain open and must continue to play 
an active role in shaping globalization. In order to 
be able to effectively assert its values and interests 
internationally, it must present a unified, consistent, 
and convincing image to the outside world.
It would be shortsighted for the EU to focus only on the 
defensive side of trade policy. The reform of its trade 
policy instruments needs to be carefully calibrated, 
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and no new doors for protectionism should be opened. 
Sovereignty should be fostered without encouraging 
autarky and protectionism. The EU should pursue an 
active, liberal trade policy. Trade policy should not be 
used primarily as a lever for other policy objectives. 
Therefore, the EU needs to push ahead with bilateral 
and plurilateral trade agreements to open foreign 
markets and to bind trading partners to rules that 
ensure fair competition. The EU should also intensify 
its efforts – together with like-minded countries – to 
modernize the rule book of the WTO, to strengthen 
its monitoring instruments, and to reform its dispute 
settlement mechanism. In doing so, the EU needs to 
be careful not to further undermine the multilateral 
trading system by establishing unilateral instruments 
that are not compatible with WTO rules.
In its efforts to reform its trade policy, the EU needs to 
consult with all relevant stakeholders and give them 
enough time to comment on its proposals. It also 
needs to take possible reactions by third countries 
into account. Dialogue remains key in preventing a 
tit-for-tat protectionist spiral.
16 Mikko Huotari and Agatha Kratz, Beyond Investment Screening. Expanding Europe’s Toolbox to Address Economic Risks from Chinese State 
Capitalism, Bertelsmann Stiftung (2019): < https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/DA_Studie_
ExpandEurope_2019.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2020). 
17 European Commission, 38th Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU’s Anti-dumping, Anti-subsidy, 
and Safeguard Activities and the Use of Trade Defence Instruments by Third Countries Targeting the EU in 2019, COM(2020) 164 final, April 30, 2020: 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/may/tradoc_158733.PDF> (accessed August 17, 2020).
3. THE UNILATERAL (EU) DIMENSION
3.1 EU Trade Defense Instruments Against Unfair 
Market Conditions at Home and Abroad
In order to level the playing field and counter unfair 
trade practices, the EU has a variety of trade defense 
instruments in place.16 But are these sufficient? The 
EU regularly publishes reports on the effectiveness 
of its trade defense instruments. According to the 
latest report, the antidumping or anti-subsidy duties 
imposed by the Commission lead, on average, to an 
80 percent decrease in unfair imports. In 2019, the 
Commission used trade defense instruments more 
actively than in 2018: It launched 16 investigations 
(2018: 10) and imposed 12 new measures (2018: 6). At 
the end of 2019, 140 trade defence measures were in 
force, 94 antidumping, 15 countervailing, and three 
safeguards. China leads the list of countries most of-
ten targeted by antidumping and anti-subsidy mea-
sures with 93, followed by Russia (10), India (7), and 
the United States (6).17 Nonetheless, there is scope 
for further reform.
3.1.1 Antidumping Measures 
WTO members have committed to not raising tar-
iffs once they have been reduced and bound in their 
tariff schedules. This ensures legal certainty in inter-
national trade. But the WTO’s rule book also permits 
exceptions.
Article VI of the GATT and the Agreement on Im-
plementation of Article VI allow WTO members to 
impose a tariff – an antidumping tariff or an an-
ti-subsidy tariff (also known as a countervailing duty) 
– on dumped and subsidized products in order to es-
tablish fair conditions of competition. The prerequi-
site is that the measures are in line with WTO rules.
There are various methods to determine dumping. 
The one most commonly applied is a comparison 
between the price charged in the domestic market 
(normal value) and the price charged in the import-
ing country. If the domestic price cannot be deter-
mined, prices of a similar product in a third country 
can be applied to determine the so-called dump-
ing margin. In the production factor method, the in-
dividual cost components incurred in producing a 
good are calculated and combined.
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The determination of dumping alone is not sufficient 
to justify the imposition of a duty. Rather, it must 
have caused or threatened to cause serious harm to 
competing manufacturers in the importing country. 
WTO rules allow the affected country to impose a 
tariff on the product in question in order to restore 
fair competition. This antidumping duty may not be 
higher than the dumping margin.
The EU’s Antidumping Regulation (AD Regulation), 
which came into force in 1995, has been repeated-
ly amended. In the mid-2000s, Peter Mandelson, 
then Trade Commissioner, attempted a comprehen-
sive reform that aimed to limit the scope of its ap-
plication. This failed, however, due to considerable 
resistance from industrial interests in a number of 
member states.18
The European Commission again pushed for a mod-
ernization of the trade defense instruments in 2013. 
The reason for this was that a key article in China’s 
WTO accession protocol was to expire in mid-De-
18 Jürgen Matthes, “Handelspolitische Schutzinstrumente zum Umgang mit Wettbewerbsverzerrungen durch China” [Trade Defense Instruments to Deal 
with Distortions of Competition from China], German Economic Institute (IW), IW-Report 12/19, April 9, 2019:  
<https://www.iwkoeln.de/studien/iw-reports/beitrag/juergen-matthes-handelspolitische-schutzinstrumente-zum-umgang-mit-wettbewerbsverzerrungen-
durch-china.html> (accessed August 17, 2020).
cember 2016. According to this article, Chinese pro-
ducers had to prove that the prices of their products 
had been established under conditions of fair com-
petition. Without this proof, dumping could be es-
tablished on the basis of the analogue country 
methodology. In 2016, the AD Regulation with its nu-
merous amendments was consolidated in a vertical 
codification process. Still, it took until July 2018 for 
an agreement to be reached and for the EU institu-
tions to finally conclude the modernization of the AD 
instrument.
An important innovation is that the EU no longer 
makes a distinction between a market economy and 
a non-market economy, also ending the related nor-
mal price calculation based on the analogue country 
methodology in the case of China. The new meth-
od is thus no longer China-specific. Rather, the pro-
duction factor methodology is now applied to all 
WTO members in cases of suspected dumping. For 
non-WTO members, however, the analogue country 
methodology was retained.
TOP-10 WTO MEMBERS  
STARTING ANTIDUMPING  
INITIATIONS IN 2019
TOP-10 WTO MEMBERS  
IMPLEMENTING ANTIDUMPING  
MEASURES IN 2019
* In addition to Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, and Pakistan also started six antidumping initiations. 
** The EU implemented four anti-dumping measures in 2019. 
Source: WTO, Antidumping: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> (accessed October 10, 2020)
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In addition, in order to establish the normal price, 
the costs incurred by EU producers in comply-
ing with local environmental and labor standards 
are now taken into consideration. Furthermore, the 
application of the Lesser Duty Rule has been mod-
ified. There is often a difference between the anti-
dumping margin and the actual damage caused – the 
injury. In the past, the EU generally used the actu-
al injury to determine the antidumping duty, if the 
latter was lower than the antidumping margin. Now, 
the full extent of the dumping margin is taken into 
account for goods imported by the European Union 
whose production was made possible by artificially 
low prices for raw materials or energy. The Europe-
an Commission is also subject to a reporting obliga-
tion, according to which it must make public its own 
assessments of market distortions in order to help 
companies to prove distortions of competition. Re-
garding countries such as China, where there is little 
transparency about prices and market forces, com-
panies find it more than difficult to present the nec-
essary evidence for dumping.19
In December 2016, China lodged a complaint against 
the EU at the WTO under the provisions of the AD 
Regulation concerning the determination of nor-
mal value for non-market economy countries in an-
tidumping proceedings. A panel was convened in July 
2017. After the panel report was finalized, China re-
quested the suspension of the proceeding in May 2019, 
which was granted in June 2019. On June 15, 2020, the 
panel’s powers under WTO rules expired. The dispute 
is therefore deemed to be terminated as the panel was 
not requested to resume its work. This development 
provides some legal certainty for the EU that the new 
Antidumping Regulation is WTO compatible.20
RECOMMENDATIONS
EU antidumping measures are essential to protect 
European producers from unfair competition from 
abroad. At the same time, it must be ensured that 
their application complies with the rules of the WTO. 
The successful completion of the reform of the Anti-
dumping Regulation in 2018 was of great importance 
to ensure that the instrument was both effective and 
WTO compatible.
19 Elvire Fabry, “Industrial Subsidies are at the Heart of the Trade War,” Notre Europe, Blog Post, January 1, 2020:  
<https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/les-subventions-au-coeur-de-la-guerre-commerciale/> (accessed August 17, 2020).
20 WTO, DS516: European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm> (accessed June 23, 2020).
21 Stormy-Annika Mildner et.al., “Antidumpingmaßnahmen der Europäischen Union” [Antidumping Measures of the European Union], BDI, June2020: 
<https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/antidumpingmassnahmen-der-europaeischen-union/> (accessed August 17, 2020).
At times, the reversal of the burden of proof posed 
a major financial and administrative challenge for 
companies. With the publication of the Commission 
reports on China, these problems were eliminated. 
It is now important that the European Commission 
publishes further market distortion reports.
According to individual business sectors, existing an-
tidumping duties are at times circumvented by various 
measures.21 This undermines the effect of the duties 
and prevents the reestablishment of a level playing 
field. It is therefore necessary to limit the possibilities 
of circumvention.
The shortening of antidumping procedures is a positive 
step forward. It would be particularly in the interests 
of smaller businesses to further streamline and facil-
itate the processes. So far, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) have often been reluctant to re-
quest antidumping measures because of the financial 
and administrative challenges associated with them. 
Administrative costs could also be reduced by further 
standardizing the individual stages in the procedure, 
e.g. in the preparation of an AD claim by providing 
checklists, questionnaires, and decision guidance with 
explanations on the websites of the Directorate-Gen-
eral for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) 
or the member states.
Furthermore, the EU should more often pursue anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings in parallel. As 
providing evidence regarding subsidization remains 
difficult, a key objective should be to create more 
transparency on subsidies in third countries.
Overall, there seems to be limited reason for a com-
plete overhaul of the antidumping instrument of the 
EU. Before any further reforms are implemented, a 
thorough analysis of the tool and its application is 
necessary, involving hearings of stakeholders. Any 
change in the AD Regulation should not be at the cost 
of one of the parties involved (applicant/defendant); it 
is important to regard the Union interest.
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3.1.2 Countervailing Measures
Industrial subsidies are nothing new but have be-
come an increasing threat to fair competition on 
global markets in recent years. According to the 
WTO, new countervailing investigations to address 
these subsidies among member states have also in-
creased with 55 new investigations initiated in 2018 
and 36 in 2019 compared to just nine in 2010.22
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) constitute anoth-
er severe challenge for rules-based and open trade, 
in particular when SOEs themselves grant subsidies 
that distort markets and entail unfair competition. In 
China, for instance, the state retains a majority share 
in all but one of the 100 largest publicly listed com-
panies.23 In Russia, SOEs accounted for over 80 per-
cent of the market value, sales, and assets of the ten 
most prominent firms in 2013.24
Especially in China, SOEs function as policy instru-
ments, through which the Chinese government 
provides loans and raw materials to foster the devel-
opment of key industries. China has built up over-
capacity in various areas and is using it to penetrate 
markets of third countries through subsidies and 
price dumping, thus distorting competition.
Countervailing duties (CVMs) are an important tool 
to counteract subsidies provided by governments or 
public bodies. The prerequisite is that such a subsi-
dy is granted to a specific firm, industry, or group of 
firms or industries. While export subsidies and sub-
sidies based on using domestic goods over imported 
ones are specific, there are considerable limitations 
in the definition of subsidies in the international rule 
book and that of the EU. For example, it is contro-
versial whether an SOE is a “public body” subject to 
the WTO anti-subsidy regime. Furthermore, trans-
parency about subsidization in third countries is very 
weak; hardly any comparative data is available. In ad-
dition, the procedure to obtain the authorization 
for countervailing duties is quite difficult. The com-
plainant carries the burden of proof to show that in-
jury has been suffered, which discourages complaints 
from being lodged. Last but not least, EU counter-
vailing duties are only applied to trade in goods, not 
trade in services.
22 WTO, “Countervailing Initiations: by Exporter 01/01/1995–31/12/2019”:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/CV_InitiationsByExpCty.pdf> (accessed August 18, 2020).
23 WTO, Trade Policy Review of China, WT/TPR/S/375, June 6, 2018: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s375_e.pdf> (accessed March 6, 2020).
24 WTO, Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation, WT/TPR/S/345, August 24, 2016:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s345_e.pdf> (accessed March 26, 2020).
RECOMMENDATIONS
The WTO rules on subsidies are comparatively weak. 
Therefore, a first reform step must include a reform 
of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures (SCM Agreement). This will be dealt 
with in chapter five of this study. The WTO reform 
is indispensable for a far-reaching reform of the EU 
instruments, as the EU must make sure that any 
changes are WTO compatible.
Because a reform of the SCM Agreement of the WTO 
could take years, the EU should use all available policy 
space to make its countervailing instrument more ef-
fective. In the future, CVMs should be designed in such 
a way to more fully address the market-distortive 
effects of foreign SOEs and industrial subsidies. This 
can help ensure competitive neutrality.
While, traditionally, CVMs have not been applied as 
often as AD duties and business has less experience 
with them, the EU should launch an official consultation 
process. Furthermore, as transparency and data are 
key, the EU – together with the other members of the 
OECD – should mandate the OECD to collect, analyze, 
and make public data on subsidization and SOEs.
A comprehensive reform of the SCM Agreement and 
the EU’s CVM Regulation would, however, only tackle 
the trade side of the issue. The EU’s White Paper “Lev-
elling the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies” 
is therefore a step in the right direction. The problem 
of state induced market distortions in domestic com-
petition, competition in third markets, investment 
(including mergers and acquisitions (M&A)), and public 
procurement also need to be addressed.
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3.1.3 EU Enforcement Regulation and the New 
Trade Enforcement Officer
In December 2019, the European Commission pro-
posed an amendment to the present EU Enforce-
ment Regulation (EU) No. 654/2014, which deals with 
the EU’s right of enforcement of international trade 
rules. The new proposal came two days after the Ap-
pellate Body of the WTO ceased to function.
The Commission views the amendment as a top pri-
ority to ensure that the European Union can enforce 
international trade law. Under current rules, the EU 
is only able to adopt countermeasures at the end of a 
WTO dispute settlement procedure with a final panel 
or Appellate Body ruling. The EU thus depends 
on authorization by the WTO to impose retaliato-
ry measures, which is no longer possible without 
a functioning Appellate Body. Under the proposed 
amendment, the EU would be allowed to impose 
countermeasures against third countries when the 
EU has received a favorable panel report but where 
the appeal is going nowhere because of the Appellate 
25 European Commission, “Commission Proposes New Tools to Enforce Europe’s Rights in International Trade,” Press Release, December 12, 2019:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6757> (accessed March 31, 2020).
26 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Amending Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Exercise of the Union’s Rights for the Application and Enforcement of International Trade Rules, COM(2019) 
623 final 2019, 0273 (COD), December 12, 2019:  
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2019/0623/COM_COM(2019)0623_EN.pdf> (accessed 
August 17, 2020).
Body blockage. If the concerned party does not agree 
to an interim appeal arbitration under Art. 25 WTO 
DSU, the EU would be allowed to impose counter-
measures without a final WTO ruling.25
Such measures include customs duties, quantitative re-
strictions, and measures in the area of public procure-
ment. They are to be “selected and designed on the 
basis of objective criteria, including the effectiveness of 
the measures in inducing compliance of third countries 
with international trade rules, their potential to provide 
relief to economic operators within the Union affected 
by the third countries’ measures, and aim at minimiz-
ing negative economic impacts on the Union, including 
with regard to essential raw materials.”26
These amendments are clearly directed at countries 
like the United States, which has blocked the reform 
of the WTO dispute settlement system. Subsequent 
to the breakdown of the WTO’s Appellate Body, the 
EU – together with 22 other members of the WTO – 
established a multi-party interim appeal arbitration 
ALL WTO MEMBERS  
STARTING COUNTERVAILING  
INITIATIONS IN 2019
ALL WTO MEMBERS  
IMPLEMENTING COUNTERVAILING  
MEASURES IN 2019
Source: WTO, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.html> (accessed October 10, 2020)
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arrangement (MPIA) in March 2020. Any participat-
ing countries can use this arrangement to settle dis-
putes among themselves until the Appellate Body is 
back to normal. While China has joined the MPIA, the 
United States is not a party to the mechanism.27
On April 8, 2020, the Council approved its negotiat-
ing position. It basically follows the proposal by the 
European Commission but wants to shorten the re-
view process to three years. The EP Committee on 
International Trade (INTA) adopted its negotiating 
position on July 6, 2020. INTA wants to broaden the 
scope of possible countermeasures to services and 
intellectual property rights (IPR). It also proposes to 
enable the EU to take provisional measures before 
a final WTO ruling. In addition, INTA wants to give 
the EP and Council the right to initiate the enforce-
ment procedure, which so far fell in the competen-
cies of the Commission. Finally, INTA wants to have 
an earlier review process. The next step in the leg-
islative process is now the trialogue negotiations of 
the Commission, Council, and EP.28
Von der Leyen and Dombrovskis proposed yet another 
- so far little specified - enforcement instrument: the 
anti-coercion mechanism to protect the EU from the 
coercive activities of trade partners such as the United 
States and China. For example, this instrument could 
be used to counter extraterritorial sanctions. Little is 
known about the ideas of the Commission so far, but 
the debate has already reached the capitals of large 
EU member states such as France and Germany. Var-
ious proposals are being circulated, including the idea 
to counter extraterritorial sanctions with market ac-
cess restrictions in the EU for services or government 
procurement or with temporary suspensions of cer-
tain property right protections.
In addition, the EU has created a new post: the Chief 
Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) at the level of 
Deputy Director-General within DG Trade. The En-
forcement Officer is responsible for monitoring and 
improving compliance with EU trade agreements by 
partner countries. This includes monitoring trade 
partners’ commitments under sustainable devel-
opment chapters in EU trade agreements. Howev-
er, there is still quite a bit of uncertainty regarding 
the concrete mandate and resources of the CTEO. In 
late July 2020, the European Commission appoint-
ed Denis Redonnet to the function of Deputy Direc-
27 European Commission, “EU and 15 World Trade Organization Members Establish Contingency Appeal Arrangement for Trade Disputes,” Press Release, 
March 27, 2020: <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2127> (accessed March 31, 2020).
28 European Parliament, Review of EU Enforcement Regulation for Trade Disputes, July 20, 2020:  
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652021/EPRS_BRI(2020)652021_EN.pdf> (accessed August 11, 2020).
tor-General in DG Trade, which encompasses the 
new role of CTEO.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The amendments to the Enforcement Regulation as 
proposed by the Commission are an important step to 
deal with trade conflicts. If a country is not willing to 
engage in mediation after a WTO panel report, the EU 
needs the reformed Enforcement Regulation to ensure 
a fair outcome and reciprocity in its trade relations. 
The proposal of the EP, on the other hand, goes too 
far in some respects. Granting the Parliament and the 
Council the right to initiate the enforcement process 
risks a politicization of the instrument. Particularly 
dangerous is the idea to implement measures before 
a final panel report. This would severely undermine the 
rule of law and, as such, the credibility of the EU as 
a defender of the rules-based trading system. It also 
risks retaliatory measures by the targeted country.
Regardless of the reform of the Enforcement Regu-
lation, the first priority must always be the reform of 
the multilateral dispute settlement system. The new 
interim appeal arbitration must not be a gateway for 
protectionism.
The coersive defense mechanism raises many technical, 
legal, and strategic questions. An act of economic coer-
sion must be clearly defined and its costs to the Union 
must be precicely calculated. If this is possible remains 
to be seen. Furthermore, such a mechanism should not 
breach European or international law, including the 
WTO‘s rules, but also those embedded in the EU‘s bilat-
eral trade agreements. In addition, as is the case with 
all defensive instruments, market access restrictions 
also always hurt the EU itself. Thus, the Union interest 
always needs to be regarded. Last but not least, the EU 
needs to consider that such an instrument is likely to 
entail countermeasures by third countries. These possi-
ble costs also need to be included in the Commission‘s 
cost-benefit analysis. 
The CTEO should be given a clear and transparent 
mandate on the basis of which he can act. The effec-
tiveness of the post also depends on the resources 
devoted to the CTEO’s office. The CTEO should be 
required to regularly publish reports on his activities 
and their effectiveness.
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3.2 Export Controls for Critical Products  
During Crises
In the course of the coronavirus crisis, concerns have 
arisen regarding the supply of medical and person-
al protective equipment (PPE). With its Implement-
ing Regulation 2020/402, the EU made the export 
of PPE subject to authorization until the end of April 
2020.29 This meant that exports from the EU were 
prohibited unless a license was obtained. The grant-
ing of such licenses was limited to exceptional cir-
cumstances that required extensive checks. Shortly 
thereafter, the EU revised its regulation (Implement-
ing Regulation 2020/426) and issued guidelines that 
effectively lifted the restrictions for the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA). The restrictions on 
exports to other third countries, however, remained 
in place. With Regulation EU 2020/568, the EU con-
tinued to control the export of protective specta-
cles and visors, mouth-nose-protection equipment, 
and protective garments. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion announced it would monitor national licensing 
authorities.30 The export controls finally expired on 
May 26, 2020.
The EU’s export controls were likely to be WTO 
compatible given the weakness of the organization’s 
rules on export restrictions. In Article XI, paragraph 
1, WTO members have committed to not introduce 
any quantitative restrictions on exports or export 
bans. Paragraph 2, however, contains a comprehen-
sive exception: “Export prohibitions or restrictions 
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essen-
tial to the exporting contracting party” are permit-
ted.31 WTO members are neither obliged to notify 
the measures to the WTO, nor to prove that a supply 
shortage actually exists. If members move to restrict 
exports of foodstuffs temporarily, the Agreement on 
Agriculture requires them to give due consideration 
to the food security needs of others.
Nonetheless, export restrictions pose a considerable 
danger. The EU’s export restrictions led to delays 
along the value chains because PPE is an indispens-
able production factor in many industrial processes, 
such as cleanroom production. This is especially true 
for the production of drugs and medical equipment. 
29 Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control, “Export von Medizinischer Schutzausrüstung” [Export of Medical Protective Equipment], March 23, 2020: 
<https://www.bafa.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/Aussenwirtschaft/Ausfuhrkontrolle/20200323_export_medizinische_schutzausruestung.html> 
(accessed April 1, 2020).
30 European Commission, Durchführungsverordnung (EU) 2020/568 der Kommission vom 23. April 2020 über die Einführung der Verpflichtung zur Vorlage 
einer Ausfuhrgenehmigung bei der Ausfuhr bestimmter Produkte [Commission Regulation (EU) 2020/568 of April 23, 2020, Introducing an Obligation to 
Present an Export Licence when Exporting Certain Products], April 23, 2020:  
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020R0568&from=DE> (accessed April 29, 2020).
31 WTO, Article XI GATT, General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art11_gatt47.pdf> (accessed August 10, 2020).
Important production sites of the (European) chem-
ical and pharmaceutical industry are located outside 
Europe – in particular in the United States, China, 
Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Canada, Mexico, and 
Russia. If international production networks are in-
terrupted, the EU also feels the supply shortages.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Export controls – even if they are compatible with 
WTO rules – are not the right way to address alleged 
shortages in critical products with complex value 
chains. Instead of protectionism, a policy is needed 
that secures and strengthens global supply chains for 
protective gear and medical goods. To increase resil-
ience, the EU should analyze vulnerabilities in critical 
supply chains. Further measures include the diversifi-
cation of supply at country and company levels as well 
as strategic reserves and stockpiling.
In the medium to long term, the EU should work on 
WTO reform regarding export restrictions because 
export tariffs and quantitative restrictions have re-
peatedly caused problems for EU businesses.
In addition, the EU should push the G20 countries to 
eliminate customs duties on pharmaceutical products 
and intermediate products as well as medical prod-
ucts in an unbureaucratic, comprehensive, and lasting 
manner. A pragmatic approach should be taken that 
avoids costly customs procedures as well as exces-
sively narrow product coverage, which could lead 
to unjustified disadvantages and distortions in the 
supply chains. The tariff reductions should be bound 
under the WTO and applied on a multilateral basis.
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3.3 International Procurement Instrument (IPI)
Public procurement is a major part of the Europe-
an economy. More than 250,000 public authorities 
in the EU spend around 14 percent of GDP on pub-
lic purchases, which accounts for about two trillion 
euros per year.32 The purchases relate to goods and 
services in areas such as public health, transporta-
tion, education, public infrastructure, security, etc. 
These public expenditures will further increase in 
the course of the current coronavirus crisis.
According to the Commission, European compa-
nies are among the most affected worldwide by dis-
criminatory measures in public procurement. These 
measures include so called de jure barriers such as 
“buy national” provisions and the exclusion of certain 
projects from government procurement rules. They 
also include de facto barriers such as a lack of trans-
parency, unpredictable enforcement of regulation, 
and corruption.33
The EU has opened its public procurement mar-
kets for certain goods and services in the frame-
work of the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA) of the WTO. The United States is also part of 
the agreement; China is negotiating an accession. 
While the European market is comparatively open, 
many other procurement markets are still closed. 
According to the Commission, the EU opened pub-
lic procurement worth 352 billion euros to mem-
ber countries of the GPA in 2012, whereas the United 
States offered public procurement worth 178 billion 
euros and Japan only 27 billion euros. China has only 
opened up a very small fraction of its market.34 There 
is also an increasing danger that subsidized compa-
nies, in particular Chinese SOEs, create unfair com-
petition in the EU’s internal market as competition 
for contracts is becoming more fierce.
In order to level the playing field, the European 
Commission proposed a new procurement instru-
ment in 2012 called the International Procurement 
Instrument (IPI). Following a legislative deadlock, the 
Commission amended the proposal in January 2016. 
In the changing geo-economic and geopolitical envi-
ronment, many of the large member states, such as 
Germany and France, now have a more positive view 
32 European Commission, Public Procurement: <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement_en> (accessed March 31, 2020).
33 BusinessEurope, “BusinessEurope’s Views on an International Procurement Instrument,” Position Paper, May 20, 2020: <https://www.businesseurope.eu/
sites/buseur/files/media/position_papers/rex/2020-05-20_views_on_an_international_procurement_instrument.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2020).
34 European Parliament, “A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalization, A New EU International Procurement Instrument (IPI),” 
Legislative Train Schedule, June 24, 2020: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-
globalisation/file-international-procurement-instrument-(ipi)> (accessed August 17, 2020).
35 Ibid.
on the proposal than in the past. Therefore, the rat-
ification of the new instrument seems within reach.
The new procedure consists of three steps. First, the 
Commission starts a public investigation if there is 
a possible discrimination of European companies in 
the public procurement market of a third country. 
Second, the Commission will start discussions with 
the respective country about a possible opening of 
the procurement market if the public investigation 
finds discriminatory practices. Third, the Commis-
sion can – but only as a means of last resort – intro-
duce a price penalty of up to 20 percent of the value 
of the offer. The prerequisite is that the offer has 
a total value of at least 5 million euros, of which at 
least 50 percent consist of goods and services orig-
inating from the respective country.35 There are ex-
ceptions for least developed countries (LDCs) and 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The IPI 
is to be applied to so-called non-covered goods and 
services, i.e. not to goods and services that origi-
nate in a country with which the EU has conclud-
ed an international agreement in the field of public 
procurement.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The IPI would help the EU to achieve more reciprocity 
in government procurement. It would strengthen the 
principle of balanced mutual market access, which is 
anchored in the GPA. The Commission’s current IPI 
proposal, however, also requires further revision in 
order to avoid negative effects on the procurement 
process.
Thus, excessive bureaucratic costs and legal uncer-
tainty for EU companies and contracting authorities, 
as well as risks in view of the proposed system of pen-
alties, must be avoided. The IPI needs to be balanced, 
non-protectionist, and compatible with the rules and 
principles of the GPA. The aim must always be to open 
the respective third country’s procurement system. 
Restrictions on the EU market as a last resort should, 
where appropriate, be as targeted and effective as 
possible. Closing off the EU market – for example, to 
a reciprocal level with third countries – should not be 
the aim of the IPI.
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Furthermore, the leverage effect vis-à-vis third 
countries should be increased, for example by more 
effective price penalties. The planned price premium 
of up to 20 percent for bidders from sanctioned states 
might be insufficient. There are cases in which the offer 
from Chinese state-owned companies was around 25 
percent lower than the next best offer. Since such com-
panies do not act solely on market-based conditions, 
it should be possible to completely exclude bidders.
Penalties are triggered if more than 50 percent of the 
total value of the goods in the tender originates from 
the targeted third country. Given the complexity of 
global value chains, establishing origin can be very 
complex and lengthy. This provision could also harm 
European companies, which are deeply integrated in 
global markets. The EU should thus discuss shifting the 
focus from the origin of the goods to the bidding entity.
In addition, the investigation and consultation time-
line should be considerably shortened. According to 
the current proposal, they could take up to 27 months 
in total – a period that does not reflect the reality of 
procurement timelines.
The IPI will be applied only to covered goods and 
services under the GPA. Still, there is also ample 
discrimination of European companies by countries 
that are part of the GPA. Therefore, the EU needs to 
intensify its efforts to have the relevant provisions of 
international agreements on public procurement be 
strictly applied.
At the same time, the EU needs to ensure that the 
IPI does not negatively impact relations with partner 
countries. Thus, dialogue and consultations remain 
key. The EU should also double its efforts to encour-
age more countries to join the GPA and strengthen its 
chapters in bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements.
Last but not least, comparative data on government 
procurement is very weak internationally. The EU and 
its member states should not only lead by example 
by publishing more in-depth data on government pro-
curement, but they should also strongly advocate for 
international organizations such as the WTO and the 
OECD to be mandated to compile comparative data.
36 European Commission, Blocking Statute:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/blocking-statute_en> (accessed August 17, 2020).
3.4 Protection Against Extraterritorial Sanctions
The United States has been using extraterritori-
al sanctions for decades to coerce other countries 
– including long-standing allies such as the EU – to 
adhere to US strategic policy goals. Already in 1996, 
the US adopted extraterritorial measures concern-
ing Cuba, Iran, and Libya. Its Helms-Burton Act, for 
example, denies visas to persons who do business in 
Cuba on properties that were expropriated from US 
citizens. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 – 
and the subsequent Iran Sanctions Act of 2006 – also 
imposed economic sanctions on companies that do 
business with the respective countries.
The EU does not accept the extraterritorial appli-
cation of laws by third countries and sees this as a 
breach of international law. It therefore adopted the 
so-called blocking statute in 1996 (Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 2271/96) with the aim of protecting EU 
citizens and business against this kind of legislation. 
The statute invalidates the effect of any foreign court 
ruling based on these laws in the EU and allows EU 
citizens to recover court damages. It also prohibits 
EU economic operators from complying with any re-
quirement or prohibition based on the specified for-
eign laws. Businesses are to inform the Commission 
if their interests were negatively impacted by the ex-
traterritorial application of foreign laws. In special 
circumstances, the Commission can grant compa-
nies an exception from complying with the blocking 
statute.36
After the United States pulled out of the Iran nucle-
ar deal (officially, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action), Washington started reimplementing sanc-
tions in August 2018. The EU immediately updated 
the blocking statute to include the coverage of these 
sanctions. In addition – with the support of the EU, 
Germany, France, and the UK – it initiated a new in-
strument of settlement for commercial accounts 
between EU members states and Iran: the special 
purpose entity Instrument in Support of Trade Ex-
changes (INSTEX).
The EU blocking statute and INSTEX are not, howev-
er, enough to outweigh the dramatic economic con-
sequences of the US sanctions, in particular in light 
of US sanctions against Russia. The EU fears that 
eventually the United States could also implement 
sanctions against China, which would hit EU com-
panies hard.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Extraterritorial sanctions harm the economic and 
foreign policy sovereignty of the EU and impair the 
global competitiveness of the European economy. 
Therefore, the EU needs to sharpen its tools to counter 
extraterritorial sanctions.
The use of the EU’s blocking statute is an important 
political signal. Its effectiveness, however, is question-
able. Furthermore, there is a fundamental flaw in the 
approach as it punishes domestic businesses in order 
to induce a policy change in the United States. The EU 
should therefore examine the effects more closely in 
order not to harm European companies and make its 
findings public.
INSTEX is a step in the right direction, but it does not 
reach far enough. The EU should intensify its efforts 
to ensure better access to essential export-related 
services, in particular for the processing of payments. 
If such regulatory measures for payment transactions 
are too risky for private payment service providers, a 
state alternative for payment transactions must be 
created. To ensure its effectiveness, the mechanism 
should encompass a critical mass of EU member 
states.
At the center of the EU’s ability to counter extra-
territorial sanctions stands the role of the EU in the 
international payment system. To strengthen its use 
and make the European Union less dependent on the 
US dollar, the EU needs to advance its financial sector 
reforms; push further integration – at least in the Euro 
Area; and strengthen its attractiveness by increasing 
investment in the competitiveness of its economy.
3.5 Investment Screening
Worries about a sell-out of European key industries 
are nothing new, but they have increased during the 
coronavirus crisis. Takeovers – in particular, those 
from China – have attracted public attention in re-
cent years although their annual number has de-
clined since 2016. The acquisition of the German 
robot manufacturer KUKA, the Chinese purchase of 
shares from Daimler, and the investment in the Ger-
man network operator 50Hertz were particularly 
controversial.
In response, the German government tightened in-
vestment screening in 2017 and 2018. A reporting 
requirement was introduced for takeovers of crit-
ical infrastructure companies. The list of economic 
sectors in which acquisitions require governmental 
approval has also been extended to include various 
“key technologies.” The extension of inspection pe-
riods has given the government further leeway. The 
threshold above which investments from third coun-
tries can be prohibited was lowered from 25 percent 
to 10 percent for critical infrastructures.
In spring 2019, a European foreign investment 
screening regulation came into force (EU 2019/452). 
While neither a European nor a common national 
FDI screening procedure is yet in place, the EU cre-
ated a framework for investment screening and laid 
the foundation for a systematic exchange of infor-
mation between member states and the Commis-
sion. Member states keep the last word on whether 
to allow a specific investment in their territory. If an 
investment poses a threat to the public order and se-
curity in more than one member state, the Commis-
sion can issue an opinion. This is also the case when 
an investment endangers a program that is of inter-
est to the Union.
Consequently, many EU members need to reform 
their investment laws, including Germany. The re-
form of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (AWG), 
passed in June 2020, foresees that, in the future, in-
vestment prohibitions will be justified not only by 
the security interest of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many but also by the public order and security in-
terest of another EU member state. The “security of 
projects or programs of Union interest” poses an-
other ground. In the fields of defense equipment 
and IT security products, it is now not only compa-
nies that manufacture or develop the corresponding 
products that can be examined but also those that 
use or modify such products or those that have used 
such products in the past. In the old AWG, the pre-
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condition for government intervention was the exis-
tence of an “actual and sufficient serious danger” to 
the basic interests of society. According to the new 
law, “likely impairment” suffices as a justification. The 
wording is based on the EU Screening Regulation.
Germany also amended its Foreign Trade and Pay-
ment Ordinance (AWV). The amendments took effect 
on June 3, 2020. According to this 15th amendment, 
new sectors are brought under the regulation of crit-
ical infrastructure, including the health sector (PPE, 
essential drugs, in vitro diagnostics in the field of in-
fectious diseases, and medical devices for infectious 
diseases). Furthermore, the regulation specifies that 
asset deals are within the scope of the FDI screen-
ings regime. Last but not least, the review can now 
also consider whether an acquirer is directly or indi-
rectly controlled by a government.37
Another reform of the AWV is expected later this 
year, likely adding further sectors and industries to 
the catalog of critical infrastructures.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Europe greatly benefits from foreign investment. 
Without question, governments should intervene to 
protect national security and public order. But invest-
ment screening needs to be proportionate and not 
create uncertainties and unjustified infringements on 
private property. Situations in which the state can and 
should intervene need to be clearly defined. Political 
measures should not encourage the international 
trend toward investment protectionism.
In the German AWG, the substitution of “actual and 
sufficient serious danger” to the basic interests of 
society with “likely impairment” creates considerable 
legal uncertainty. It remains largely open in which 
respect impairments must exist and how serious an 
impairment must be. This imprecise formulation ex-
tends the discretionary scope of the administration 
– also against the background of the requirements of 
the EU Screening Regulation – well beyond what is 
necessary. Therefore, the next reform should aim to 
specify this indicator.
Germany’s federal government already has a wide 
range of instruments at its disposal to deal with the 
current challenges – also during the coronavirus crisis. 
37 Hartmut Krause, “Germany: Update on Foreign Direct Investment Screening – Health Care Sector Becomes Part of Critical Infrastructure,” Allen & Overy, 
June 3, 2020: <https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/germany-update-on-foreign-direct-investment-screening> 
(accessed August 17, 2020).
According to the AWG, the government can review and 
prohibit takeovers of German companies from third 
countries if there is an actual and sufficiently serious 
threat to the basic interests of society. A pandemic, 
such as the current one, is one such reason to consider. 
Accordingly, the German government should be careful 
not to add further sectors and industries to the catalog 
of critical infrastructures that do not face a permanent 
threat for national security and public order.
On the European level, the inclusion of the security 
interests of other member states, as well as programs 
of Union interest, is justifiable. The European member 
states should, however, take care that the revision 
does not lead to industrial policy instrumentalization 
in practice.
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3.6 Carbon Border Adjustment
The European Climate Law that was proposed by 
the Commission is one of the most important com-
ponents of the so-called EU Green Deal, including 
a legally binding target of net zero greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050. This goal also has a trade dimen-
sion. To ensure that EU industry is not put at a disad-
vantage vis-à-vis foreign producers, the Commission 
proposes to install a border adjustment mechanism 
(BAM) for greenhouse gas-intensive goods from 
countries that have implemented no or insufficient 
climate protection measures. Products from these 
countries could be subject to tariffs, or foreign pro-
ducers could be obliged to purchase emission rights. 
The proceeds from these measures could be used to 
finance investment programs under the Green Deal. 
In early March 2020, the European Commission initi-
ated an Impact Assessment of BAM. The public con-
sultation period is open until late October 2020.
Two factors speak for government measures to re-
duce CO2 emissions. On the one hand, climate is a 
public good for which the self-regulation of mar-
kets fails. Since the use of the Earth’s atmosphere has 
no price in a pure market system, there is little in-
centive to treat it carefully. On the other hand, CO2 
emissions are external effects emanating from pro-
duction; they affect the situation of other econom-
ic participants but do not appear in the cost balance 
of the emitter. Through climate protection measures 
such as limits for CO2 emissions, CO2 taxes, or trad-
able emission certificates, the state can put a price 
on the climate good and allocate the external costs 
to the polluter.
If the important economies do not all engage in cli-
mate protection, however, an optimal allocation is 
not possible. The restriction of the use of CO2-in-
tensive, carbon-based fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) 
results in economic costs for energy-intensive in-
dustries in the signatory states. The consequence is 
a weakening of the international competitiveness of 
these industries compared to competitors in coun-
tries without binding climate protection targets. 
This, in turn, provides an incentive to relocate en-
ergy- and carbon-intensive industries to countries 
with less ambitious climate targets. Consequent-
ly, domestic production would be replaced by im-
ports of carbon-intensive goods. It is quite possible 
that the production of the imported goods is asso-
ciated with higher emissions than domestic produc-
tion – the domestic emission reductions could then 
be more than offset by increased emissions abroad 
(carbon leakage).
In this respect, on first sight, it makes perfect sense 
to flank climate policy instruments with a BAM – not 
only to ward off competitive disadvantages but also 
to prevent non-signatory states from undermining 
multilateral climate protection goals. It is question-
able, however, whether such measures are compat-
ible with WTO law, particularly the following three 
principles:
1. The most-favored nation treatment rule, accord-
ing to which trade concessions granted to one WTO 
member must also be granted to all others;
2. National treatment, according to which imported 
goods should be treated equally to locally-produced 
goods after they have entered the market;
3. The like-product rule, which prohibits worse 
treatment of “similar (like) goods.”
The WTO allows BAM for indirect taxes, i.e. taxes 
on products. If the marginal burden of an import-
ed CO2-containing energy source is not excessively 
high in comparison to the tax burden of a domes-
tic similar product and does not give it a competi-
tive advantage, border adjustment is considered 
to be WTO compatible. The legality of border ad-
justment in the case of goods that are greenhouse 
gas-intensive in their production, however, has not 
been clarified. The tax would therefore be levied be-
cause of the production method. But according to 
the like-product rule, the consideration of produc-
tion and process methods is only permissible if they 
shape certain characteristics of the product.
Article XX GATT provides an exception: trade re-
strictions are permitted if human, animal, or plant 
health is endangered. The same applies to the pro-
tection of an exhaustible natural resource – even 
outside the jurisdiction of the state concerned. This 
was confirmed by the WTO Appellate Body in 1998 
in the landmark dispute over US import restrictions 
on shrimp from Thailand to protect sea turtles en-
dangered by the fishing methods that were used. The 
prerequisite is that the trade restriction must make 
a direct contribution to the conservation of this ex-
haustible natural resource and must neither con-
stitute arbitrary discrimination against states nor 
create a competitive advantage for the domestic 
product. Furthermore, no alternative, less trade-dis-
torting instruments can be available.
In the end, whether a BAM is WTO compatible or not 
can ultimately only be decided by the WTO Dispute 
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Settlement Body. Furthermore, collecting the rele-
vant data to determine the CO2 content of a product 
will be very difficult, making the implementation of a 
BAM very challenging as well.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Carbon Border Adjustments should only be imple-
mented under the strict proviso that WTO compati-
bility and practicability are guaranteed. A careful and 
comprehensive impact assessment is indispensable 
before the Commission takes legislative initiatives. 
In addition, the Commission should evaluate further 
instruments against carbon leakage. Furthermore, 
support for the transformation of industry is key. 
When assessing alternatives, practical feasibility and 
possible effects on complex value chains and networks 
– as well as on the export side of the economy – must 
be soundly considered. Disproportionate bureaucratic 
efforts for administration and businesses must be 
avoided. The risk of carbon leakage should not simply 
be shifted to other parts of the value chain. Negative 
effects on downstream industries and disruptions in 
international value chains must be avoided. Last but 
not least, it is important to note that a BAM risks re-
taliatory measures by key trading partners. Therefore, 
the EU needs to engage in a dialogue on its planned 
reforms early on, for example in the realm of the G20.
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Source: European Commission, DG Trade,  
2019 Annual Activity Report:  
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/july/
tradoc_158886.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2020)
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4. THE BILATERAL DIMENSION:  
EU BILATERAL AND REGIONAL  
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
FTAs have been a key feature of the European 
Union’s trade agenda since its Global Europe Strate-
gy of 2007.38 Therefore, contrary to general opinion, 
the European Commission has acted strategical-
ly in trade policy for more than a decade, looking 
for partners with large market opening opportuni-
ties. The EU’s strategy is driven by both interests and 
values.
After considerable criticism and protest about the 
way the EU conducted trade policy during the nego-
tiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), the EU updated its trade strat-
egy with the Trade for All communication in 2015.39 
Increasing the transparency of negotiations, the 
Commission now urges the Council to publish the 
negotiating mandates immediately after adoption. In 
addition, the Commission has started to publish the 
key negotiating texts and the final text of all ongoing 
FTA negotiations online. In addition, the Commission 
holds regular stakeholder consultations on various 
trade policy issues.
4.1 Ambitious FTAs with Strategic Partners
Since 2007, the EU has successfully negotiated a 
wide range of new, ambitious trade agreements, 
which cover a variety of areas outside traditional 
market access. Modern trade agreements have been 
concluded with industrialized countries (Canada, Ja-
pan), emerging market economies (Singapore, Bra-
zil/Mercosur), and developing countries (Vietnam, 
Indonesia). They include chapters on trade in goods 
and services, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures, customs and trade 
facilitation, subsidies, investment, digital trade, com-
petition policy, SOEs, government procurement, and 
the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). 
FTAs also include a dispute settlement mechanism. 
And because these new generations of EU trade 
agreements substantially cover all trade (Art. XXIV 
GATT), they are in line with WTO rules. In addition, 
these agreements contain a number of WTO-Plus 
provisions, which could be multilateralized at a lat-
er date.
38 European Commission, “Global Europe, Competing in the World,” October 4, 2006:  
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:en:PDF> (accessed April 10, 2020).
39 European Commission, Trade for All (see note 10).
40 European Commission, Negotiations and Agreements:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#_in-place> (accessed April 7, 2020).
Since 2011, the EU has also included chapters on 
trade and sustainable development (TSD) in its FTAs. 
These chapters include commitments for both sides 
to ratify specific International Labor Organization 
(ILO) conventions and to comply with the standards 
of multilateral environmental agreements such as the 
Paris Agreement. If one party breaks the TSD com-
mitments, there will be government-to-government 
consultations. Unlike in FTAs negotiated by the Unit-
ed States, however, TSD is not subject to the dispute 
settlement of a bilateral agreement. The Commission 
believes that sanctions are not the right way to im-
prove the implementation of the TSD chapters.
Currently, the EU has concluded agreements with 
31 countries that have entered into force and agree-
ments with 46 countries that have entered into force 
provisionally. Furthermore, the EU is currently nego-
tiating agreements with an additional 29 countries, 
although 24 of these are suspended or paused for the 
time being.40 Apart from FTAs, these numbers also in-
clude Association Agreements (e.g. with Chile, Egypt, 
and Tunisia), Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs with African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries), 
Stabilization and Association Agreements (with West 
Balkan countries), and Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreements (e.g. with Iraq, Kazakhstan, and Ar-
menia). Table 1 (see pp. 26–27) provides an overview 
of the status of the FTAs that have been negotiated 
since the Global Europe Strategy of 2007.
These comprehensive FTAs with strategic partners 
have positive economic effects as they increase mar-
ket access on both sides, fostering trade and invest-
ment, which, in turn, boosts economic growth and 
job creation. This is particularly important in the 
context of the economic depression resulting from 
the coronavirus crisis. Furthermore, FTAs help to 
shape globalization and rules-based trade. They con-
tain modern WTO-plus trade rules, which are need-
ed to address important trade issues for European 
companies.
In addition, from a geo-economic perspective, FTAs 
with strategic partners help the EU to uphold rules-
based trade with important trading partners in times 
of WTO crisis. If the WTO system further deterio-
rates, the current web of ambitious free trade agree-
ments can serve as an insurance system for the EU.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to preserve and increase the EU’s leverage 
in these trade agreements, the unity of EU member 
states is crucial. EU member states must focus their 
efforts on fostering cohesion around common Europe-
an positions. This is essential in the current geo-eco-
nomic environment, in which only EU unity can help 
the EU to remain an important player in global trade 
and investment.
Given the upcoming ratification process of the 
EU-Mercosur trade agreement, the idea of a sanc-
tions-based approach to the TSD chapter will return to 
the agenda – particularly with regard to the Amazon 
fires in Brazil. The improvements to the existing model 
(increased transparency, a more assertive approach) 
will probably not be enough. A consultation and 
mediation approach should remain the way forward. 
Furthermore, the EU could consider side-agreements 
to the FTA covering environmental issues.
In addition, the EU should consider deepening the 
agreements even further. One important area would 
be more ambitious chapters on digital trade, which 
should cover the gaps that exist in the global trading 
regime in order to create legal certainty and limit pro-
tectionism. Therefore, such chapters should include, 
for example, provisions on the non-discriminatory 
treatment of imported digital products. It is also 
necessary to limit requirements for data localization. 
In addition, EU FTAs should contain strong rules to 
combat threats to cybersecurity.
Further areas to strengthen are the chapters on subsi-
dies and SOEs; MSMEs; notification requirements, par-
ticularly for non-tariff barriers; and dispute settlement.
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TABLE 1 – EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (FTAS) SINCE THE GLOBAL  
EUROPE STRATEGY 2007
COUNTRY NAME OF  
THE FTA







On September 21, 2017, CETA provisionally entered 
into force after ratification by the EP. It now needs to 
be ratified by the individual EU member states due 
to its investment chapters. 
CETA is the most ambitious FTA of the EU to date and 
serves as a model for future agreements. In addition to 
increased market access, it includes, among others, chapters 
on TBT, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), customs 
and trade facilitation, subsidies, investment, services, 
e-commerce, competition policy, SOEs, government procure-










Negotiations on TTIP started in 2013 and ended 
without conclusion (“put in a freeze”) at the end 
of 2016. The Council decided in April 2019 that the 
negotiating directives are now obsolete. 
There are two new mandates on an agreement for 
the elimination of tariffs on industrial goods and on 
conformity assessment. 
In August 2020, the EU and the US concluded a small 
agreement that eliminates EU tariffs on lobster in 
return for lower US tariffs on some EU goods on a 
most-favored-nation (MFN) basis.
The next steps for the negotiations on the two possible 
agreements on industrial goods and conformity assessment 
need to be decided.
A new approach toward a transatlantic agreement will need 
to wait until after the US elections in November 2020.




The EU and Mexico wanted to update their existing 
agreement from 2000. Negotiations started in 2016; 
two years later, in April 2018, the EU and Mexico were 
able to reach a political agreement. 
In April 2020, both sides reached a final agreement.
The EU Mexico agreement includes chapters on trade in 
services, IPR, customs, and investment. Both sides also 
reiterate their obligations under the Paris Agreement. 
Discussions on a list of entities at the sub-federal level in 
Mexico, which would open their public procurement markets 
for EU companies, were solved in April 2020.
Right now, the legal scrubbing of the agreement is taking 
place. After its translation into all EU languages, the ratifica-
tion procedure will start. 
South Korea EU-South Korea 
FTA
The agreement had been provisionally applied since 
July 2011 and was finally ratified in December 2015.
This was the first FTA that the EU concluded with an Asian 
country and it was deeper and more ambitious than any 
agreement the EU had negotiated so far. The agreement 
addresses non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs), especially in 
the important automotive, pharmaceutical, and electronics 
sectors. It also includes provisions on competition, govern-











In 2007, the EU tried to negotiate an agreement 
with ASEAN. This attempt was abandoned in 2019 in 
favor of bilateral agreements with individual ASEAN 
countries.
The bilateral agreements with individual ASEAN countries 
are based on the ASEAN negotiation directives. 
There is also an EU-ASEAN Joint Working Group, which has 







Negotiations started in 2010. The agreement was 
signed on October 19, 2018. Because of uncertainties 
about the EU ratification process, the FTA could only 
enter into force in November 2019 once it was ratified 
by the EP and endorsed by the MS. 
The investment protection agreement (IPA) still 
needs to be ratified by the 27 EU member states 
before it can enter into force.
Singapore is the most developed country in the region and 
the third largest Asian investor in the EU (after Japan and 
Hong Kong). The agreement liberalizes trade in services and 
addresses a variety of behind the border issues such as TBT 







In 2010, the EU also launched FTA negotiations with 
Malaysia. However, the negotiations were put on hold 
in 2012 due to differences in the levels of ambition. 
The new government, which came into office in 
2018, still has to announce how it will approach the 
negotiations.
Source: Own compilation based on information provided by DG Trade, European Commission
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COUNTRY NAME OF  
THE FTA
STATE OF THE  
AGREEMENT
FURTHER INFORMATION





In 2012, the EU launched negotiations with Vietnam. 
The trade and investment agreements were conclud-
ed and signed in June 2019. 
The Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam entered into 
force on August 1, 2020.
The IPA still needs to be ratified by EU member 
states.
Vietnam is the EU‘s second largest trading partner in ASEAN. 
The EU trade agreement with Vietnam is the most ambitious 
deal ever signed with an emerging economy. The agreement 
includes chapters on services, government procurement, 
and regulatory barriers as well as a chapter on social and 
environmental protection standards.





In 2013, the EU started negotiations with Thailand. 
However, the negotiations were suspended in 2014 
due to the military coup in the country.
In October 2019, the Council stressed that it is important to 
take steps to resume the negotiations.





Negotiations were launched in December 2015, but, 
since 2017, no date was set for the next round of 
negotiations.
In September 2016, the EP expressed concern about the 
high number of people who were killed in the anti-crime 
and anti-drug operations of the Philippine government 
(“War on Drugs”). The EP condemned these actions again in 
March 2017 and April 2018. As the EU connects free trade 
agreements with a respect for human rights and democracy, 
there is currently no progress in the negotiations.





In 2016, negotiations were launched. In June 2020, 
the last round of negotiations took place.
The EU‘s aim is to cover as wide a range of complex trade 
issues as contained in the agreements with Singapore and 
Vietnam. Thus, there will be chapters on trade in goods 
and services, government procurement, trade remedies, 
IPR, customs, etc. However, similar to the agreement with 
Vietnam, the EU will take the development status of Indone-
sia into account.
India EU India The negotiations started in 2007, however, due to the 
different levels of ambition, they have not proceeded 
any further since 2013.
India is the tenth largest trading partner of the EU (2019) 
and belongs to the fastest growing large economies in the 
world (pre-COVID). Therefore, an agreement would be highly 






In March 2013, the EU launched negotiations with 
Japan. EUJEPA entered into force in February 2019.
There are separate negotiations going on about an 
IPA with Japan.
Japan is the second most important trading partner of the 
EU in Asia after China. The agreement abolished tariffs on 
almost all product lines and liberated trade in services. It 
also includes many ambitious trade chapters on subsidies, 




In June 2018, negotiations started on a FTA with 
Australia. 
Negotiations are proceeding quickly, and the Commission 
has already issued text proposals for all substantial areas. 
In order to have an EU-only agreement, the EU has decided 
to leave investment out of the negotiations.






In June 2018, negotiations started on a FTA with New 
Zealand.
Negotiations are proceeding quickly. Investment protection 
is also left out of this agreement. 
The next negotiation round will take place after the general 
elections in New Zealand in October 2020.
Mercosur EU-Mercosur 
Region to  
Region  
Agreement
Negotiations were started in 2000. After long 
periods of no progress, both sides reached a political 
agreement in June 2019. 
Both sides are engaged in the legal revision. After 
its translation into all EU languages, the ratification 
process can start. 
The ambitious agreement includes chapters on TBT, SPS, 
services, government procurement, IPR, sustainable devel-
opment, and SMEs. 
Due to the fires in the Amazon region, there is a lot of 
opposition regarding the ratification of the agreement in 
the EP and the member states. The governments of Austria, 
France, and Ireland have stated that they will refuse to ratify 
the agreement in its present from.
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4.2 Ratification of FTAs
The EU has a ratification problem. For a long time, 
there was considerable legal uncertainty concerning 
the mixed and exclusive competence of the EU and its 
member states – in other words, which chapters of an 
FTA had to be passed by both the EU and national lev-
el and which chapters only needed to be agreed upon 
by the EU level. The May 2017 decision of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice on the EU-Singapore FTA final-
ly brought light into this issue. The court ruled that 
the investment provisions – on portfolio investments 
and a dispute-settlement regime for investments – 
required ratification by the EU level and all member 
states while the remainder of the issues fell under the 
exclusive competence of the EU.41
Although this clarification is helpful for future trade 
agreements, it does not solve the ratification problem 
of older agreements. Currently, association agree-
ments with six countries, EPAs with 30 countries, 
FTAs with five countries, and partnership agree-
ments with five countries are provisionally applied.42 
In most instances, this means that the parts that fall 
under EU competence are provisionally applied after 
ratification by the EP. These provisions relate to the 
IPA – portfolio investment and investment dispute 
resolution – which still await ratification by the 
member states. This is also the case for the agree-
ments with Canada, Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan.
In order to avoid only partially ratified agreements, 
the EU decided to carve out the IPAs from future trade 
agreements. Consequently, the EU started to negotiate 
FTAs with Australia and New Zealand only on issues 
related to trade and foreign direct investment, which 
fall under the exclusive competence of the EU.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For the EU to remain an attractive FTA partner to third 
countries, it needs to ensure that mixed and provision-
ally applied trade agreements are decided upon by the 
legislatures of the EU member states in a more timely 
manner.
The EU’s decision to negotiate trade agreements that 
fall into the exclusive competence of the Union – and 
thus do not need to be ratified by the legislatures of all 
member states – is the right way forward. Contrary to 
41 Arthur Beesley, “EU Singapore Ruling Charts Possible Brexit Path,” Financial Times, May 16, 2017:  
<https://www.ft.com/content/f9cf18e4-3a1b-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec> (accessed April 16, 2020).
42 BDI, “Aiming for Better Utilization of EU Free Trade Agreements,” March 25, 2020, p. 6:  
<https://english.bdi.eu/publication/news/aiming-for-better-utilization-of-eu-free-trade-agreements/> (accessed August 17, 2020).
widely held beliefs, this approach does not undermine 
the legitimacy of EU trade policymaking. Through the 
Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has a strong 
say in trade policy. It not only has to be consulted 
regularly on the agreements, but it also votes on 
them. The member states, on the other hand, have a 
strong say in the decisionmaking process through the 
Council. 
The Commission, however, is not the only body that is 
responsible for creating transparency in trade policy-
making; rather, the executive branches of the respec-
tive member states also need to keep their legislators 
informed and consult with them on a regular basis.
The carving out of IPAs is one way to move the 
bilateral trade agenda forward. The EU should not 
end its efforts here, however. Investment protection 
and the resolution of investment disputes remain 
important. Therefore, the EU should continue its ef-
forts to negotiate modern investment treaties and to 
gather support for the establishment of a multilateral 
investment court. Most urgently, negotiations on the 
bilateral investment treaty between the EU and China, 
which was supposed to be finalized by the end 2020, 
need to be pursued more forcefully.
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4.3 Utilization of FTAs
A third problem of existing FTAs – apart from the 
lack of EU unity and the complexity of ratification 
– is their low utilization rate by EU companies. In 
a 2018 study for the European Commission, Lars 
Nilsson and Nicolas Preillon looked at the preference 
utilization rate (PUR), which is the share of trade that 
takes place under the preferential tariffs of FTAs. 
That study found that the average PUR among 18 
FTAs was 77.4 percent and for Germany 78 percent.43 
In a follow-up survey, the Federation of German In-
dustries (BDI) found three major reasons for the lack 
of FTA use in Germany:
1. Costs and bureaucracy to comply with the agree-
ment, in particular rules of origin (RoO);
2. Lack of internal capacity to verify the complex 
compliance procedure;
3. Legal uncertainties in verifying whether a product 
falls under the FTA.
If the tariff margin between the preferential tariffs 
and the bound WTO tariff is very low and the dif-
ferent EU FTAs vary too much, it is often easier for 
companies to simply use the WTO tariff.44
Rather tellingly, the utilization rates of the Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (known 
as CETA) and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EUJEPA) are particularly low. According 
to the Commission, the PUR for CETA in 2018 was 
only 37 percent. Partly, this is because implemen-
tation is ongoing, and companies are still getting 
familiar with the agreements. However, compa-
nies also point to changes in the verification pro-
cedures of RoO. The main responsibility for origin 
verification was transferred from the customs au-
thorities of the exporting countries to the au-
thorities of the importing country. The importer’s 
knowledge is now central to the verification pro-
cess. According to the Commission, this shift was 
made to ensure that preferential treatment was 
properly applied while simplifying both the proof 
and verif ication of origin. Companies, howev-
er, fear that the new procedures will not only lead 
to legal uncertainty but also infringe on intellectual 
property rights and endanger sensitive data (e.g. Eu-
ropean know-how, prices, and production processes). 
43 Lars Nilsson and Nicolas Preillon, “EU Exports, Preference Utilisation and Duty Savings by Member State, Sector, and Partner Country,” DG Trade Chief 
Economist Note (June 2018): <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/june/tradoc_156931.pdf> (accessed April 7, 2020).
44 BDI, “Aiming for better Utilization” (see note 41), pp. 14–15.
Subsequent legal specifications in the EU-Japan 
agreement were not able to eliminate these worries.
Another problem that companies have identified is 
the direct transport principle in many FTAs. In order 
for a good to qualify for preferential tariff treatment, 
it must be shipped directly from one partner country 
of the agreement to the other. Consequently, compa-
nies that use central storage facilities (hubs) for long 
delivery routes often do not benefit from preferen-
tial tariffs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to improve the utilization rate of FTAs, the 
EU should negotiate simple and standardized rules 
of origin that apply to all sectors (and possibly to all 
agreements) to avoid a spaghetti bowl of rules. Doing 
so would make it easier for companies to adhere to 
these rules. To facilitate the use of FTAs by SMEs, it 
would also be advisable to have IT systems in place 
that can test whether an export product falls under 
the preferential tariffs in a standardized way.
Another means of helping companies would be to 
introduce a more flexible cumulation rule to all FTAs. 
Cumulation reflects the regionalization and globaliza-
tion of value chains, allowing producers greater flexi-
bility regarding sourcing inputs and parts. Cumulation 
allows originating products of country A to be further 
processed or added to products originating in country 
B, just as if they had originated in country B. There are 
three forms of cumulation: bilateral, diagonal, and full 
cumulation, the latter being the most flexible – and 
far-reaching – type. Full cumulation already applies in 
CETA, EUJEPA, and the European Economic Area, and 
it should be applied in all future FTAs.
The problems associated with the direct transport 
principle and the use of regional hubs could be solved 
by innovative technologies such as microchips placed 
directly on the goods.
In addition, the EU needs to ensure that the verification 
procedure for rules of origin does not risk disclosing 
sensitive data to foreign authorities. Furthermore, it is 
important to increase information about the require-
ments and benefits of FTAs, foremost making them 
more attractive for SMEs. 
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At the same time, the EU needs to increase its efforts 
to ensure that FTA partners play by the rules of the 
game. In the past, there have repeatedly been prob-
lems in the area of non-tariff barriers and notification 
requirements. The new Chief Trade Enforcement Offi-
cer could play an important role in this regard.
5. THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSION:  
GLOBAL TRADE RULES UNDER  
THE WTO
The EU is the largest trading bloc in the world and 
has highly integrated trade relationships with ma-
ny countries and regions. As such, it is dependent on 
the transparent and binding rules-based trading sys-
tem of the WTO. The EU is therefore highly commit-
ted to the reform of the organization.
The WTO has four main pillars, all of which are in crisis:
1. The dispute settlement system;
2. The rule-setting function;
45 WTO, “Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Complainant”:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (accessed May 3, 2020).
3. Multilateral trade liberalization, namely the  
 Doha Development Round (DDA);
4. Trade policy monitoring to which the notification  
 of subsidies is connected.
In its concept paper of September 2018, the EU tried 
to shape the discussions on WTO reform in a con-
structive way, offering concrete proposals.
5.1 Binding Dispute Settlement System
The EU is an active user of the WTO dispute settle-
ment system. Since the creation of the WTO, the EU 
has been a complainant in 104 cases including, among 
others, 35 against the United States, eleven against In-
dia, and nine against China. The cases against the Unit-
ed States mainly dealt with safeguard measures, such 
as US antidumping and countervailing duties, as well as 
large civil aircraft (Boeing). The complaints against Chi-
na focused on antidumping duties and measures relat-
ed to the export of various raw materials (raw earths).45
The EU has also been sued (a respondent) in 87 cas-
es since 1995. The United States brought 20 cases 
* Since the founding of the WTO in 1995 | Source: WTO
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against the EU, and China five. The main complaints 
from the US involved safeguard measures, IPR en-
forcement, large civil aircraft (Airbus), and sanitary 
and phytosanitary issues such as hormone beef or 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Chi-
nese complaints mainly involved antidumping mea-
sures on products such as steel and footwear as well 
as price comparison measures. In addition, the EU 
has been a third party in 208 cases.46
The administration of US President Donald Trump 
was the first to shine a spotlight on the functioning 
of the WTO dispute settlement system – foremost on 
the procedure and rulings of the Appellate Body (AB). 
The concerns of the United States relate to disregard 
for the 90-day deadline for appeals, continued ser-
vice by persons who are no longer AB members, the 
issue of advisory opinions, and the claim that AB re-
ports are entitled to be treated as precedents. In ad-
dition, the US criticizes that the AB has added to or 
diminished the rights and obligations of the member 
states. This criticism relates specifically to the defi-
46 WTO, “Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Member”: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (accessed May 3, 2020).
47 European Commission, “WTO Modernization: Introduction to Future EU Proposals,” Concept Paper, September 18, 2018:  
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2020).
nition of what constitutes a “public body,” which is 
essential for the use of trade remedies.
In response to this criticism, the EU published a 
“concept paper” on WTO modernization in Sep-
tember 2018,47 which lists all of the ongoing – and 
sometimes very technical – details of the US con-
cerns about the AB and tries to provide very spe-
cific answers to them (see Table 2 on p. 32). So far, 
the initiative has already been officially sponsored by 
eleven other WTO member states, including China, 
Canada, India, Australia, South Korea, and Mexico.
The United States objected to the reform proposals 
– foremost the provision to expand the term for AB 
members. The underlying US concerns are less techni-
cal and more political. The current US administration 
does not want an international body to interfere with 
its American trade and trade remedy laws. In the end, 
Washington opposes any international body that sup-
posedly hampers its ability to fight dumping and hid-
den subsidies of non-market economies such as China. 
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The ongoing refusal by the United States to appoint 
new judges to the AB has led to a crisis of the dis-
pute settlement system. On December 10, 2019, there 
were less than three members left, which is the min-
imum required for an appeal. Without a functioning 
AB, any party to a dispute may attempt to block the 
adoption of panel rulings by appealing them. As a re-
sult, the whole WTO dispute settlement process is 
essentially inoperative.
In order to restore a functioning rules-based dispute 
settlement, the EU initiated the establishment of the 
multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement 
(MPIA) together with 22 other WTO member states. 
This arrangement will help settle disputes until the 
AB is back to normal. If Joe Biden, the Democratic 
candidate, wins the US presidential elections in No-
vember 2020, progress could be possible. Although 
the Democrats share almost all of the aforemen-
tioned concerns voiced by the Trump administration, 
they are more willing to work together with partners 
like the EU to achieve reforms.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The decision of the EU to create a MPIA is an important 
intermediary step in upholding the rules-based mul-
tilateral trading system. The MPIA must not, however, 
prevent the EU (and other countries) from trying to 
reform the binding Appellate Body and make it work 
again. The EU’s proposals are well considered and 
provide a good basis upon which to develop future 
WTO reform. The EU should therefore continue to try 
to gather support from the other WTO member states 
for its reform proposals.
Regardless of who becomes the next US president, the 
EU should pursue all available means to establish a 
dialogue in order to convince the US administration 
of the need for a reformed but binding Appellate 
Body. This can be done through government-to-gov-
ernment consultations as well as through a variety of 
channels such as the Transatlantic Economic Council, 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue, and Transatlantic 
Legislators Dialogue.
TABLE 2 – MAIN US CONCERNS REGARDING THE APPELLATE BODY  
AND EU RESPONSES
US CONCERNS EU RESPONSES
90-day deadline for 
appeals (Art. 17.5) 
has repeatedly been 
ignored
The EU suggested amending Article 17.5 of the dispute settlement understanding 
(DSU) to state that: “In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days, unless the 
parties agree otherwise.” If there is no agreement, there should be a mechanism 
that ensures that the working arrangement could be adapted to stay within the 
deadline. 
In addition, the EU proposes to increase the number of AB members from seven to 
nine and provide that the membership is a full-time job to increase the efficiency of 
the Appellate Body.
Continued service by 
persons who are no 
longer AB members 
(Rule 15)
The EU also proposes the introduction of transitional rules to avoid that members 
continue to serve on the Appellate Body even though their terms expired. Accord-
ing to the EU proposal, Rule 15 should be codified. Then, the DSU could agree e.g. 
that an outgoing Appellate Body member could complete the pending appeal.
Issuing of advisory 
opinions on issues 
that are not neces-
sary for the solution 
of the dispute
The EU proposes to modify Article 17.12 of the DSU to avoid the issuing of advisory 
opinions that are not relevant to the case. The article now states that the Appellate 
Body “shall address each of the issues raised” on the appeal. Here, the EU proposes 
to add: “to the extent this is necessary for the resolution of the dispute.”
AB reports are enti-
tled to be treated as 
precedents (judicial 
overreach)
Finally, the EU wants to introduce regular exchanges between the AB and WTO 
members to address the issue of legislative overreach. Here, concerns about the 
approaches of the Appellate Body rulings could be voiced. In addition, the EU 
proposed to a have a single but longer term for Appellate Body members (from six 
to eight years) to increase the independence of the appeals body.
Source: Own compilation based on information in the EU Concept Paper “WTO Modernization” (see note 46)
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5.2 Binding New Rules for Subsidies
While the WTO rule book contains disciplines on sub-
sidies, these are weak – in particular regarding SOEs. 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures (SCM Agreement) only vaguely defines subsidies. 
It also only covers export subsidies and subsidies in-
tended to increase domestic supply or replace imports. 
The SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as (a) a financial 
contribution (b) by the government or any public body 
within the territorial jurisdiction of a member state, 
which (c) confers a benefit. Furthermore, only specif-
ic subsidies are subject to the disciplines of the SCM 
Agreement (see Table 3 on p. 34).
In addition to the very narrow scope of prohibit-
ed subsidies and the limited definition of actionable 
subsidies under the SCM Agreement, recent findings 
of the WTO’s AB further limit the reach of this agree-
ment. In its March 2011 ruling on Chinese SOEs and 
the use of antidumping and countervailing measures, 
the AB issued a very narrow definition of what con-
stitutes a “public body.” The ruling states that a pub-
lic body needs to “possess, exercise, or be vested with 
governmental authority.” This does not cover SOEs.
Moreover, the hurdles to obtain the authorization 
for countervailing duties are high: The complainant 
bears the burden of proof to show the injury that 
has been suffered and must demonstrate a causal 
link between the injury and the subsidized imports. 
Opaque government funding in some countries 
makes this very difficult. In addition, the notification 
disciplines under the WTO for subsidies are weak.
On January 14, 2020, in the context of the Trilater-
al Initiative, the EU, the United States, and Japan is-
sued a joint statement. Among other proposals, this 
statement tables a comprehensive reform of the SCM 
Agreement to more precisely regulate government 
subsidization of industrial goods and their exports. 
COUNTERVAILING INVESTIGATIONS AND MEASURES INITIATED AMONG  
WTO MEMBERS, 1995–2019
60
New Investigations Measures Imposed
20001995
Source: WTO, “Countervailing Initiations: by Exporter 01/01/1995–31/12/2019” (see note 21) and “Countervailing Measures:  
By Reporting Member 01/01/1995–31/12/2019”: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/CV_MeasuresByRepMem.pdf> (accessed September 11, 2020).
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Concretely, the Trilateral Initiative proposes to add 
four new types of so-called unconditionally prohib-
ited subsidies: “unlimited guarantees, subsidies to 
an insolvent or ailing enterprise in the absence of a 
credible restructuring plan, subsidies to enterprises 
unable to obtain long-term financing or investment 
from independent commercial sources operating in 
sectors or industries in overcapacity, [and] certain 
direct forgiveness of debt.”48
The proposal also addresses the adverseness of the 
following types of subsidies: “Excessively large subsi-
dies, subsidies that prop up uncompetitive firms and 
prevent their exit from the market [so-called zombie 
enterprises], subsidies creating massive manufactur-
ing capacity without private commercial participation, 
[and] subsidies that lower input prices domestical-
ly in comparison to prices of the same goods when 
destined for export.” The trilateral parties rightly as-
sert that these subsidies should be withdrawn un-
less members can prove that the measures have been 
transparently notified and that they result in “no seri-
ous negative trade or capacity effects.”
In addition, the trilateral partners criticize the find-
ings of the AB that subsidizing entities does not suc-
cessfully meet the definition of a public body and, 
as such, that government support did not qualify as 
WTO-prohibited subsidies.
48 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States, and 
the European Union,” January 14, 2020: <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/january/joint-statement-trilateral-
meeting-trade-ministers-japan-united-states-and-european-union> (accessed August 14, 2020).
RECOMMENDATIONS
The European Commission should undertake more 
intensive investigations into Chinese subsidies to 
create the basis for greater application of the EU’s 
anti-subsidy instruments. The EU Commission should 
evaluate whether or not the burden of proof could be 
reversed in order to facilitate the implementation of 
countervailing measures against unfair subsidies. At 
the same time, companies need to assist the Commis-
sion in its efforts by providing empirical evidence and 
concrete cases.
The proposals of the Trilateral Initiative are well 
thought out and should thus be discussed at the next 
WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2021. In 
order to reach consensus on comprehensive reform of 
the SCM Agreement, the trilateral parties should ramp 
up efforts to get other member states – such as the 
other prominent G7 and G20 states – on board with 
their proposal in the coming months.
In addition, in order to direct countervailing measures 
properly, the monitoring and reporting of industrial 
subsidies across sectors needs to be markedly 
improved. A central, methodologically consistent 
database of industrial subsidies across various sectors 
should be compiled by the OECD or WTO.
TABLE 3 – SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (SCM AGREEMENT)
TYPE OF SUBSIDY ACTION EXAMPLES
Prohibited  
Subsidies
Prohibited 1. Subsidies contingent on export perfor-
mance (“export subsidies,” a detailed list of 
which is annexed to the SCM Agreement)
2. Subsidies contingent upon the use of 




They are not prohibited but subject 
to challenge in the event that they 
cause adverse effects (e.g. export 
displacement) to the interests of 
another WTO member, either in the 
market of the subsidizing member or 
in a third country.
Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement  
identifies instances of such serious preju-
dice to the interests of another member. 
This does not include distortion to produc-
tion capacity.
Source: WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:  
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2020)
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5.3 Trade Liberalization and the Status of  
Developing Countries
The EU is disappointed with the negotiating pillar 
of the WTO, namely the Doha Development Agenda, 
which has not achieved many tangible outcomes 
since its start in 2001. At the last MC11 in Buenos Ai-
res in December 2017, then EU Trade Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmström rightly criticized that WTO mem-
bers failed to achieve any multilateral outcome.49 
The EU has since looked for alternative ways to up-
date the WTO rule book. Therefore, the MC11 was a 
breakthrough because members – including the EU – 
broke with the concept of the single undertaking and 
opened the way for plurilateral agreements in the ar-
eas of e-commerce, investment facilitation, domestic 
regulation in services, and MSMEs. These plurilater-
al agreements are the only way forward to negotiate 
modern trade rules that better reflect today’s trade 
realities.
A related aspect is the definition of developing coun-
tries. The WTO has no criteria differentiating be-
tween developing and industrialized countries. 
Rather, members self-determine their develop-
ment status. Consequently, large emerging econo-
mies, such as China, are still treated as developing 
countries and, thus, benefit from special and differ-
ential treatment (SDT). This means, for example, lon-
ger periods to phase in obligations and more lenient 
obligations.
Therefore, in its 2018 concept paper on WTO reform, 
the EU proposed that members should actively be 
encouraged to “graduate,” meaning opt-out of SDT. 
Member states should make it clear where they use 
the flexibilities and present roadmaps to their end of 
SDT, i.e. their “graduation.” In addition, the EU wants 
to make SDT as targeted as possible in future agree-
ments. Instead of block exemptions, it proposes an 
approach that is needs-driven and evidence-based.50
In February 2019, the United States identified four 
criteria to determine whether WTO members should 
receive SDT. WTO members who are also members 
of the OECD or the G20, classified as “high income” 
by the World Bank, or account for “no less than 0.5 
percent of global merchandise trade (imports and 
exports)” should not qualify as developing countries. 
Accordingly, WTO members such as China would no 
49 European Commission, “WTO Meeting in Buenos Aires: A Missed Opportunity,” December 13, 2017:  
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1772> (accessed April 21, 2020).
50 European Commission, “WTO Modernization” (see note 46), pp. 6–7.
51 Hannah Monicken, “US Proposes Categories to Prevent WTO Self-designation as Developing,” Inside US Trade, February 15, 2019:  
<https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/us-proposes-categories-prevent-wto-self-designation-developing> (accessed April 20, 2020).
longer qualify.51 Although the EU and others share 
the concerns of the United States, the majority of 
countries saw the US proposal as very confronta-
tional. Unlike the US, the EU is offering a discussion 
with developing countries on their SDT needs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Multilateral approaches, which are global and non- 
discriminatory in nature, are still the best way for-
ward to level the playing field and foster world trade. 
Therefore, the EU must facilitate agreement in areas 
in which multilateral outcomes are possible. The EU 
should table its proposal on trade and health issues 
(abolition of tariffs on drugs and medical equipment) 
at the WTO soon. In addition, the EU must improve its 
offer with regard to the fisheries subsidies negotiations 
to achieve a positive outcome at the MC12 next year.
In order to modernize the WTO rule book, the EU should 
pursue more plurilateral trade topics in addition to the 
present ones. One important initiative would be the 
conclusion of the Environmental Goods Agreement 
(EGA), which was supposed to be finalized in 2017 but 
failed to reach agreement in the final stages of nego-
tiations. Other areas relate to industrial subsidies (see 
section 5.2 above), e-commerce, and services trade.
The issue of the development status of countries is 
also crucial for the working of the entire organization. 
Because of its history, the EU has a special relationship 
with many developing countries, particularly in the 
area of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). 
The EU should increase dialogue with the developing 
countries on the issue of “graduation” to deal with the 
SDT issue in a pragmatic and evidence-based way.
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5.4 WTO Notification and Monitoring
The fourth pillar of the WTO is the monitoring func-
tion. In order to achieve transparency, members are 
regularly reviewed under the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM). The frequency of these reviews 
depends on the country’s share of world trade. The 
notification of subsidies – as foreseen in the SCM 
Agreement – is one prerequisite for a transparent 
TPRM.
The United States has continually criticized that 
WTO members – particularly, China – have not ful-
filled their notification requirements. Therefore, they 
introduced a transparency and notification propos-
al at the WTO Council on Trade in Goods in 2018, 
which was co-sponsored by the EU, Japan, and oth-
ers. One of the main elements of the proposal is the 
idea of possible counter-notifications.
The EU also addresses the problem of transparen-
cy and notification in its concept note of September 
2018. First, the EU suggests that all WTO commit-
tees that oversee notification obligations on trade 
in goods should evaluate how to make the notifica-
tions more effective. This could include allowing the 
Secretariat to make qualitative assessments on the 
notifications. Second, the EU proposes to give assis-
tance to small and developing countries to help with 
notifications. Third, the EU wants to work with oth-
er WTO members to enforce notification compli-
ance. The EU is considering the use of sanctions (e.g. 
limiting certain rights related to WTO processes) to 
punish continuous non-compliance. Fourth, the EU 
wants to cooperate more with like-minded mem-
bers to work on counter-notifications. Lastly, the EU 
wants to increase peer pressure through the TPRM.52 
It is also pushing for these reforms together with the 
United States and Japan in the Trilateral Initiative.
The EU’s analysis and concerns – in tandem with the 
United States and Japan – are valid. Notification re-
quirements need to be strengthened to allow the 
WTO to provide more transparency. The proposals 
for a stronger role for the Secretariat to assess the 
quality of the notifications are therefore important. 
Also, the assistance to small and developing coun-
tries is long overdue.
52 European Commission, “WTO Modernization” (see note 46), p. 4.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The crucial aspect in the notification of subsidies is the 
idea of counter-notifications, which could improve the 
overall transparency of trade policy. The cooperation 
between the European Union and the United States in 
this field is therefore important. Both should enhance 
these practices to improve transparency.
A complicated aspect is the idea of sanctions to en-
force compliance. Many WTO members are opposed 
to this approach. In order to improve and reform the 
monitoring pillar and to gather the necessary support 
from other member states, it is advisable to first focus 
on more widely accepted ways to increase notifica-
tions – such as quality assessments of notifications, 
requirement to explain reasons, etc. – and, at least for 
now, to leave sanctions out of the discussion.
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6. CONCLUSION
The geo-economic and geopolitical environment is 
changing and the EU has to adapt. The EU needs to 
act more assertively and use the economic weight of 
the internal market to defend and promote European 
interests and values. The European Commission thus 
rightly initiated a trade policy review.
At the same time, the concept of Open Strategic Au-
tonomy poses some danger. Protectionist sentiments 
have been on the rise in the European Union for 
years. Thus, it is also not surprising that most of the 
debates around Open Strategic Autonomy focus on 
the defensive side of trade policy. There is little dis-
cussion about the bilateral and multilateral dimen-
sion of EU trade policy – not only in the wider public 
but also increasingly in political circles in many EU 
member states. Merely focusing on the defensive, 
however, would be short-sighted. The EU should 
use its combined impact to simultaneously level the 
playing field and uphold the rules-based trading sys-
tem by focusing its trade policy review on all three 
dimensions of EU trade policy.
The Unilateral (EU) Dimension: To settle trade dis-
putes effectively in times of a deadlocked multilater-
al dispute settlement body, the EU needs to amend 
its Enforcement Regulations. The newly established 
post of Chief Trade Enforcement Officer can al-
so help strengthen the position of the EU vis-à-vis 
third countries. In the light of the 2018 reform, the 
EU does not need to overhaul its Antidumping Reg-
ulation. The instrument should, however, be further 
streamlined, and more assistance could be granted 
to SMEs. To counter subsidies abroad, antidumping 
and countervailing procedures should more often 
be pursued in parallel. In particular, the EU needs to 
strengthen its countervailing instrument. The same 
holds true for the Union’s ability to open up govern-
ment procurement markets abroad. The proposed 
IPI is a step in the right direction. While trade can be 
a powerful instrument to improve environmental and 
labor standards in trading partners – in particular 
through bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements 
– unilateral instruments such as Carbon Border Ad-
justments must be WTO compatible to minimize the 
risk of severe trade distortions and retaliations from 
trading partners.
The Bilateral Dimension: Bilateral and regional trade 
agreements have long been a strong second pillar of 
the European Union’s trade policy, the most ambi-
tious being the ones with Canada and Japan. In or-
der to preserve and increase the EU’s leverage in 
FTAs, the cohesion of EU member states is crucial. 
It is also important that the negotiated agreements 
are ratified and implemented in a much more time-
ly manner. To improve the ratification process, the 
EU’s strategy to negotiate agreements that fall into 
the exclusive competence of the EU is the right way 
forward. Last but not least, in order to improve the 
utilization rate of FTAs, the EU should negotiate sim-
ple and standardized rules of origin. EU trade agree-
ments should also reflect the increasing importance 
of digital trade.
The Multilateral Dimension: At its core, the Europe-
an Union is multilateralist. Today, the WTO is in deep 
crisis. Reforming the WTO must therefore remain a 
top priority. The most pressing issue is reestablish-
ing a functioning dispute settlement system. The 
MPIA is an important step in upholding the rules-
based trading system – but it is only a temporary 
solution. Together with the United States and Japan, 
the EU has proposed to strengthen the rules on sub-
sidies. If a multilateral agreement is out of reach, the 
EU should push for a plurilateral accord. Plurilateral 
agreements – such as those currently negotiated on 
digital trade, services, investment, and MSMEs – are 
a viable option to advance the global trade rule book. 
Last but not least, the EU needs to double its efforts 
to encourage emerging market economies such as 
China to “graduate” and opt-out of the special and 
differential treatment options.
The EU is on the right track, but the coronavirus 
pandemic has made the reform of European trade 
policy even more urgent. This relates to all three di-
mensions of trade policy. If the EU succeeds, it will 
be able to reassert itself as a global player in trade 
and investment. This, however, will only be possible 
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